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CHAPTER 3 
 
COSTING FESTIVALS AND WAR: 
SPENDING PRIORITIES OF THE DEMOCRACY  
 
DAVID M. PRITCHARD  
 
Introduction 
 
In Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener of 1817 August Boeckh passed judgement 
on the relative cost of Athenian festivals. By ‘squandering away the public revenue in 
shows and banquets at home’ the Athenians of the fourth century caused their armed 
forces to be ‘in a continually declining state’.1 For Boeckh this policy was ‘unjust and 
inexpedient, inasmuch as the continuance of it without oppressing the allies was 
impossible, and the State, being deprived of the means of self-defence in a most 
frivolous and unpardonable manner, was led on to certain destruction’.2 In support of 
his view Boeckh cited an assembly speech of 352/1, in which Demosthenes 
unfavourably compared the city’s waging of war to its organisation of festivals (4.35-
7; cf. Diodoros 13.94.1-2; Isokrates 7.52-3): ‘In matters pertaining to war and its 
preparations (paraskeu"i) everything is disordered (atakta), uncorrected and 
indeterminate (aorista – 36).’3 As a result, all naval expeditions (tous d’apostolous 
pantas) are dispatched too late to prevent Philip of Macedon taking city after city (35, 
37). By contrast, the preparations of the City Dionysia and Great Panathenaia are 
ordered (tetaktai) by law, guaranteeing the sponsors of choruses and teams know 
exactly what to do and ‘nothing remains unexamined and indeterminate (aoriston – 
36)’. As a consequence, Demosthenes declares, the two festivals take place on time, 
have greater crowds and paraphernalia (paraskeu"n) than any other, and use up more 
money than is spent even on a single naval expedition (eis h"na t$n apostol$n). 
Boeckh suggested ‘this weak point’ was recognised as well by Plutarch, who 
proposed in his On the Glory of Athens: ‘If the cost of the production of each drama 
were reckoned, the Athenian people would appear to have spent more on the 
production of Bacchaes and Phoenician Women and Oedipuses and the misfortunes 
 
1 Boeckh 1828, volume 1, 360-1 (book 2 chapter 21).  
2 Boeckh 1828, volume 1, 280 (book 2 chapter 12).  
3 Burckhardt 1996, 215-24. For its date, see Cawkwell 1962a, 122-7; Milns 2000, 206.  
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of Medeas and Electras than they did on maintaining their empire and fighting for 
their liberty against the Persians.’4
In the balance of his two-volume book Boeckh canvassed exhaustively the 
epigraphical and literary evidence which was then available on the scale, 
expenditures and organisation of the festivals of classical Athens and its military 
corps and expeditions, which helps explains why The Public Economy of Athens,
despite its publication nearly two centuries ago, is still considered the most thorough 
treatment of its subject.5 Importantly however, Boeckh never attempted estimates of 
the global costs of the festival-program nor of the waging of war as support for his 
negative view of Athenian funding priorities.6 Therefore the burden of this chapter is 
the estimation of these total expenditures in order to test Boeckh’s unequivocal 
judgement on the relative cost of Athenian festivals and the reliability of the literary 
passages which he cited in its defence. This will also help determine whether festivals 
and drama or military affairs were the overriding priority of the Athenian people.  
 The task of estimating total expenditure on city-sponsored festivals is made 
easier by recent investigations of the funding arrangements of the City Dionysia, 
which have been spawned by the shift of scholarly focus towards the ‘social context’ 
of Greek theatre during the last generation.7 The first to do so carefully were Eric 
Csapo and William Slater, who concluded, in The Context of Ancient Drama, that 
Athens of the later fifth century contributed 6 talents to the City Dionysia, while its 
chorus sponsors spent 18 talents (‘t.’) and 5800 drachmas (‘dr.’) of their own money.8
The second of their figures was initially supported by Peter Wilson, whose 
independent calculations, in The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, 
the City and the Stage, yielded a figure ‘just short of a massive 18 talants for five 
days’ choral performance’.9 Subsequently Wilson has completed a new study of this 
question as part of the project funded by the Australian Research Council which he 
and Csapo are co-directing on the social and economic history of classical Greek 
drama. His investigation draws on a vast array of often overlooked evidence from 
 
4 Moralia 349a. Translation by Csapo and Slater (1994, 149).  
5 Boeckh 1928, volume 1, 280-302 (book 2 chapters 12-13), 332-93 (book 2 chapters 19-29); 
volume 2, 199-222 (book 3 chapters 21-3). E.g. Samons 2000, 19.  
6 Baldry claims (1971, 33): ‘The German scholar Boeckh estimated direct Athenian state 
expenditure on all festivals of 25 to 30 talents.’ As The Public Economy of Athens gives no such 
estimate, this appears to be erroneous (Kallet 1998, 359 n.33).  
7 E.g. Walton 1977. Winkler and Zeitlin 1990.  
8 Csapo and Slater 1994, 119-21, 141 pace Baldry 1977, 32-4. 
9 P. Wilson 2000, 95; cf. 2003, 168.  
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fifth- and fourth-century Attike and comparative material from elsewhere to estimate 
how much this festival cost around 415.10 His final figure for public spending on the 
pay of the poets and musicians, equipment, and beasts for sacrifice is 13 t. 1300 dr., 
while the private outlay of the chorus sponsors and the supervisors of the procession 
adds up to 15 t. 3900 dr.11 Interestingly these costings have renewed the early 
confidence in the literary evidence Boeckh cited.12 For example, Csapo and Slater 
believe the comment of Plutarch ‘though exaggerated, is not widely so’.13 Citing their 
figures, Lisa Kallet suggests the two passages ‘reflect a popular perception of heavy 
expenditure on festivals’, which is factually correct, while Wilson concludes that 
‘ancient claims about Athenian expenditure on their theatre are fully justified’.14 In so 
doing they have called into question the consensus of military historians that 
Athenian spending on the armed forces was truly enormous and ‘dwarfed all other 
public expenditure’.15 Of the attempted costings of the City Dionysia the last 
investigation by Wilson is clearly the most comprehensive. Therefore its grand total 
of 28 t. and 5200 dr. for the City Dionysia will be incorporated into my calculations.  
 The City Dionysia and the Great Panathenaia were of course the major civic 
festivals of classical Athens and hence accounted for a significant portion of its 
festival-related spending (e.g. Aristophanes Peace 416-20).16 The combined spending 
on these two festivals should serve then as a solid basis for estimating total spending 
on the whole program of state-supervised festivals and public sacrifices.17 Since we 
 
10 P. Wilson 2008, 88. 
11 P. Wilson 2008, 119.  
12 E.g. Sandys 1897, 109-10 with bibliography. 
13 Csapo and Slater 1994, 141. 
14 Kallet 1998, 47; P. Wilson 2008, 119. Contra Golden 1998, 164-5.  
15 Quotation from van Wees 2000, 81. Pritchard 2005a, 16. For his part Boeckh wrote of the 
‘unusually large and inevitable expenses’ of Athenian military activity and how even ‘large sums 
were expended upon naval preparations in time of peace’ (1828, volume 1, 333, 338-9 [book 2 
chapters 19-20]).  
16 Parker 1996, 5-7, 92; 2005, 253-4, 317; P. Wilson 2000, 12. 
17 Mikalson details very clearly the distinction between state-supervised festivals, sacrifices 
and sanctuaries and those of the demes and private groups (2005, 160): ‘We may first distinguish 
state cults and religious activities from those of a family and village in that they were directed to the 
welfare of the city-state as a whole, were financed by state revenues, and were open, barring any 
specific cultic regulations, to all citizens of the city-state and their families. The state at its expense 
provided through elected, allotted, or appointed officials the sacrificial animals, administered and 
provided prizes for games, built the temples and other major buildings, and had general oversight 
over the performance of ritual activities. In Athens the priesthoods of most state cults remained with 
individual families in the fifth century, but the state had lay commissioners to superintend the 
property, expenses, and even the timely and appropriate performance of the rituals.’ For the rapid 
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already have Wilson’s total for the City Dionysia, this chapter concentrates on the 
cost of the Great Panathenaia and on the question of what percentage of the 
expenditure on the entire program these showcases accounted for. Working out how 
much war cost is more complex than might be expected. With only a handful of 
exceptions military historians of classical Athens have shied away from estimating its 
global cost, because of its great variability between the centuries and from year to 
year.18 They have sought to give only a general sense of the scale of public 
expenditure by detailing the known costs of sieges, recorded recurring spending on 
particular corps, and their own calculations of the cost of an ‘average’ armada.19 In 
the circumstances a great deal of this chapter is devoted to estimating the range of 
actual military spending year by year.  
 Comparing the costs of Athenian festivals and military activity is only possible 
for the period from 430 to 350 BC. Before the Peloponnesian War the surviving 
evidence is simply too limited to allow for the reliable estimating of either activity. 
For the eight decades which this study covers public and private spending on state-
sponsored festivals was remarkably stable. Most of the democracy’s new festivals 
were introduced before 460, the number of festival liturgies remained relatively 
steady during the Peloponnesian War, the final defeat had no discernible impact on 
what elite citizens spent on these public services, and ‘there is little evidence of the 
Athenians intervening with the way in which major festivals were celebrated in the 
first half of the fourth century’.20 This stability enables the generation of cost-
estimates of Athenian festivals which hold true from 430 to 350 on the basis of the 
surviving evidence from across this period. Indeed they would not be possible 
without this aggregating of data, because what testimonia we have for Athenian 
religious celebrations is simply too thin and chronologically scattered to support 
costings of them in a smaller timeframe of, for example, a decade or a quarter of a 
century. By contrast, military spending varied greatly between 430 and 350. The loss 
 
but piecemeal expansion of the Athenian democracy’s supervision of pre-existing cult from the 
470s and the various forms of its financial and administrative oversight, see respectively Ostwald 
1986, 137-74 and Aleshire 1994, especially 14-15.  
18 Gabrielsen 1994, 115; Samons 2000, 209; cf. Baldry 1977, 34. The exceptions are Brun 
1983, 144-61; Robbins 1918; Unz 1985. 
19 E.g. Gabrielsen 1994, 114-8; Raaflaub 2007, 109; Samons 2000, 207; van Wees 2000, 107-
8; cf. Hansen 1991, 316; Kallet 1998, 46.  
20 Quotation from Osborne 2007, 14-15. For the flurry of new festivals in the democracy’s 
first fifty years, see Osborne 1993, especially 27-8. For this stability in liturgical numbers and 
expenditure, see Christ 2006, 163; P. Wilson 2000, 89-93; 2008, 112.  
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of one half or more of the citizen-population during the Peloponnesian War and the 
collapse of the tribute-bearing empire at its close massively reduced the scale of war 
which Athens could wage in the fourth century.21 As a consequence this chapter 
attempts separate costings of military affairs in the later fifth century and in the first 
half of the next century.  
 The Athenians made significant changes to their financing of military activity 
and festivals after 350. In the so-called Social War of 357 to 355 Athens had more 
ships at sea than at any time since the Peloponnesian War (Diodoros 16.12).22 The 
enormous cost of this conflict and the loss of the city’s largest allies in the final 
defeat caused many sources of state revenue to dry up (Xenophon Ways and Means 
5.12), the annual income of the city to plunge to 130 t. (Demosthenes 10.37), and the 
economy as a whole to contract (Isokrates 8.19-21).23 After some years of public and 
private debate about how best to address this crisis (e.g. Demosthenes 13.1-5), the 
d"mos finally passed, by 349/8 at the latest, the reforms which Euboulos and others 
had developed (1.19-20; 3.11-13). These redirected any surplus of the city’s annual 
income into a new the$rikon or festival fund, whose initial purpose was to provide 
citizens with the necessary cash to buy entrance to the city’s dramatic contests.24 In 
spite of the source-confusion Eberhard Ruschenbusch has established that Euboulos’ 
introduction of this payment (which was also known as the the$rikon) around 350 
‘must no longer be called into question’.25 In the wake of the defeat Athens began 
recovering remarkably quickly. By 353/2 the scale of its naval expeditions had 
returned to the level of the 360s, in the late 340s its annual income had bounced back 
to 400 t. (Demosthenes 10.38), and, once the the$rikon had built up sufficiently, 
Euboulos and the fund’s other commissioners introduced participation payments for 
other city-based festivals and paid directly for shipbuilding and other so-called capital 
costs of war (e.g. Aiskhines 3.25-6; Deinarkhos 1.96).26 The reforms of Euboulos, 
however, significantly changed the city’s financing of military activity. As a result, 
 
21 For this loss of population, see Akrigg 2007, 29-33; Hansen 1988, 14-18; Pritchard 2005a, 
20-1.  
22 Burckhardt 1995, 115, 125; Hornblower 2002, 264-5.  
23 With Cawkwell 1963, 61-2 n.85.  
24 Cawkwell 1963; Hansen 1991, 98, 263-4; E.M. Harris 2006, 121-39; Rhodes 1981, 513-5. 
25 Csapo 2007, 100-3; Ruschenbusch 1979 with the primary sources. Quotation from 
Ruschenbusch 1979, 308.  
26 The Athenian general, Khares, for example, probably campaigned in the north with a fleet 
of 30 ships from 353/2 to 346/5, while Athens sent no less than 3 expeditions to aid Olynthos 
during 349/8 (Burckhardt 1995, 114; Cawkwell 1962a, 130, 139; 1984, 34-5 – all with testimonia). 
For the scale of Athenian expeditions in the 360s, see part 4 below.   
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we cannot assume that the capital and fixed operating costs of the armed forces, 
which can be reliably estimated from the early 370s to the later 350s, stayed the same 
after 349/8.  
 These reforms also inaugurated ever-increasing spending by the city and private 
individuals on state-sponsored festivals. For want of evidence the the$rika-payments 
cannot be reliably costed.27 But they must have added up to a significant total for 
Demades to have called them the ‘cement of the democracy’ (Plutarch Moralia 
1011b). After their crushing defeat at Khaironeia, in 338/7, the Athenian d"mos took 
up the proposals of Lykourgos and other leading citizens for expanding their program 
of festivals.28 New festivals and public sacrifices were introduced, existing festivals 
picked up new ag$nes (‘contests’) and more sumptuous celebrations every four years, 
and upper-class priests began spending more out of their own pockets.29 In light of 
these discontinuities a comparison of festival-related and military spending after 350 
would require new costings. The lacunose state of the evidence in this period and the 
difficulty of including pre-350 testimonia cast doubt on the feasibility of such 
estimates. They are certainly beyond the scope of my investigation.  
 This chapter is divided into five parts. The first calculates on the basis of 
surviving evidence and arguments from probability estimations of the two classes of 
private spending on the Great Panathenaia. These are then combined with the 
documented figures of public spending to produce a suggested global cost of this 
religious showcase. Part two takes the four standard ritual acts of an Athenian festival 
one by one, quantifies the scale of their performance at the City Dionysia and Great 
Panathenaia, and compares this to what was done in the rest of the state-sponsored 
program of festivals. These comparisons, in turn, suggest a safe minimum for what 
percentage of overall spending these two celebrations represented. Since Wilson has 
reliably costed the City Dionysia and part one does the same for Athena’s festival, 
this final percentage makes possible a cost estimate of the entire program. Part three 
calculates how much Athens spent every year on its armed forces from 433/2 to 
423/2 by combining the surviving figures which we have for public income and war 
loans. The annual average of these 11 years is used as the measure against which the 
cost of the subsequent stages of the Peloponnesian War is estimated. Part four draws 
on extant evidence and probability to estimate the yearly totals of public and private 
 
27 Cawkwell 1963, 53-4; Hansen 1991, 315-16.  
28 Osborne 2007, 15.  
29 Humphreys 2004, 77-129; Parker 1996, 242-53.  
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spending on the Athenian armed forces from 378/7 to 370/69 before considering 
whether military spending remained at the average level of these 9 years into the 
360s. Part five brings together the chapter’s various estimates in order to test 
categorically Boeckh’s judgement about the relative costs of Athenian festivals and 
the reliability of the literary evidence which he and subsequent scholars have cited in 
its defence. It also considers what this pattern of expenditure might tell us about the 
public priorities and interests of the classical Athenians.  
 
1. The Cost of the Great Panathenaia 
 
The Great Panathenaia was the large-scale version of the city’s annual festival in 
honour of its patron deity, Athena, which was staged every four years. This festival 
did not mark the goddess’ birthday (a misinterpretation going back to the nineteenth 
century) but celebrated the Gigantomachy and Athena’s prominent role in this victory 
of the Olympians over the Giants (e.g. Aristotle fragment 637 Rose).30 No other 
Athenian festival had a larger and more varied program than this four-yearly 
showcase: there were ag$nes for individuals in a wide range of athletic, equestrian 
and musical events and others for choruses and for tribal teams of torch racers, 
comely young men and sailors.31 The pomp" (‘procession’) of the Great Panathenaia 
involved thousands of citizens and non-citizens and traversed the heart of the city, 
conveying the newly made peplos or robe for Athena and the so-called hecatomb for 
the public sacrifice (see part 2 below). The direct costs of these ritual acts were borne 
by Attic farmers, the public purse and wealthy individuals and were on a par only 
with those of the City Dionysia.  
 The winners and placegetters in the sporting events of the Panathenaic games 
received as prizes finely painted amphorae, ranging in number from a hundred or 
more for chariot-race victors to only a handful for boys coming third in athletic 
contests.32 These amphorae may have had a unique shape and have been especially 
commissioned for each celebration but they were only the containers of the 
recognised prize: the materially valuable olive oil which was sacred to Athena (e.g. 
Ath. Pol. 60.1; Pindar Nemean 10.33-7).33 Aristotle explains how, in his day, the oil 
for the prizes was raised by a general levy on the oil-production of individual farmers 
on whose plots so-called moriai or sacred olive trees grew, whereas, in earlier times, 
 
30 Shear 2001, 29-38 with primary sources pace Neils 1992a, 14-15.  
31 Kyle 1987, 33-9, 178-95; 1992; Shear 2001, 231-387.  
32 Johnston 2007.  
33 Shear 2003a, 98.  
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it was collected directly from the sacred trees by entrepreneurs who had bought from 
the democracy the right to do so at a profit (Ath. Pol. 60.2; Lysias 7.2).34 For the 
Athenians these trees were offshoots of the world’s first olive tree which Athena had 
planted on the Akropolis (e.g. Euripides Trojan Women 802).35 They were found on 
‘many’ plots of farmed land right across Attike (Lysias 7.7, 24-5, 29).36 The annual 
levy in Aristotle’s day was overseen by the eponymous archon, who handed over the 
oil so acquired to the treasurers of Athena (Ath. Pol. 60.3).37 In turn the treasurers 
stored the sacred oil on the Akropolis until just before each celebration of the four-
yearly festival, when they measured it out to the so-called athlothetai. This last board 
of magistrates is first attested for the 440s (Plutarch Perikles 13.11) and had become 
the chief administrators of the Great Panathenaia by 415/4 at the latest (IG I3 370.66-
8).38 Aristotle explains (Ath. Pol. 60.1): ‘…they hold office for four years: they 
administer the procession at the Panathenaea, and the musical contests, the athletic 
contests and the horse race; they are responsible for making the robe, and together 
with the council for the making of vases, and they present the olive oil to the winning 
athletes.’39 
For this festival we have a fragmentary list of events and prizes for victors and 
placegetters (IG II2 2311), which is dated, on epigraphical grounds, to the 380s.40 
Julia Shear builds a strong case that its publication, the recording of the eponymous 
archon’s name on Panathenaic amphorae, which manifestly begins around 380, and 
the means of levying oil outlined by Aristotle were part of a general reform of the 
procuring of the festival’s prizes, which took place sometime in the 380s.41 Drawing 
on what is an unsurpassed collection of testimonia concerning the Panathenaia and 
first-hand knowledge of the stone, Shear proposes a convincing restoration of this 
prize-list, which includes the full program of attested events at Panathenaic 
 
34 Rhodes 1981, 672-4; Shear 2003a, 96-102.  
35 For the testimonia, see Parker 1987, 198-9; Shear 2001, 405.  
36 With Hanson 1998, 143-7, 157-61, 236-7.  
37 Contrary to what Aristotle and Lysias imply, the collection of olive oil and the production 
of amphorae certainly did not take place in every year of the Panathenaic quadrennium, as the 
surviving prize pots of the mid-fourth century never record the name of the eponymous archon of 
the first year of this four yearly cycle (Valavanis 1997, especially 87).  
38 Shear 2001, 455-63.  
39 Translated by Rhodes.  
40 For a photograph of its two fragments, see Neils 1992a, 16, fig. 1.  
41 Shear 2001, 407; 2003a, 103.  
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celebrations of the early fourth century and most of its prizes.42 The surviving portion 
of this inscription mentions 819 amphorae, to which, she plausibly argues, we can 
add with reasonable certainty another 628 for the men’s athletic contests, adding up 
to 1447 prize amphorae.43 Shear continues: ‘…rough extrapolation from the 
preserved prizes for the hippic competitions suggests that the total number of 
vases…certainly exceeded 2,000, perhaps by as much as 100 or 150 vessels.’44 
Scholars have traditionally assumed that the Panathenaic amphora held one 
metretes or twelve choes.45 The metretes and chous were standard liquid measures of 
the Athenians and equivalent to 39.40 and 3.28 litres respectively.46 In his re-
appraisal of this vessel from the sixth to the fourth centuries Martin Bentz tests this 
assumption by measuring the capacity of seventy-one surviving prizes, which, as the 
condition of many amphorae precludes the use of liquid, happens to be the most 
thorough study of this question to date.47 Bentz establishes that Panathenaic prizes 
cluster closely around an average volume of 36.73 litres, which points strongly to the 
goal of filling each pot with one chous short of a metretes.48 However, even if 
Athena’s treasurers only measured out eleven choes for each amphora, the filling of 
2100 of them would have required an extraordinary 1925 metretai or 75,845 litres of 
olive oil. Although this oil was raised through a general tax-in-kind and not by 
purchase on the open market, estimating as best as we can its monetary value gives us 
a clearer idea of how much Attic farmers contributed to the Great Panathenaia. Due 
to the great variability in olive-harvests and war-related disruptions of inter-city 
trade, the cost of oil in classical Greece varied greatly, with recorded prices ranging 
from 12 dr. per metretes to several times this figure.49 A ‘more common price’ was 
probably between 16 to 18 dr., which represents the stable range of prices from the 
 
42 Her dissertation collects the archaeological, epigraphical and literary evidence for the 
millennium-long history of this festival (Shear 2001). For her new edition of the extant text of IG II2
2311 and her restorations of its lacunae, see Shear 2003a, 88-9 and 103-5 respectively.  
43 Shear 2003a, 102. Her figures find some corroboration in Johnston’s earlier study of IG II2
2311, which came up with a ‘possible minimum figure’ of 1423 prize amphorae (1987, 129).  
44 Shear 2003a, 102.  
45 E.g. Neils 1992b, 39; Pritchett 1956, 195; Valavanis 1986, 455; Young 1984, 116. 
46 Bentz 1998, 34; Pritchett 1956, 182. 
47 Bentz 1998; cf. Shear 2003a, 101-2.  
48 Bentz 1998, 31-40, 200-1. 
49 See Pritchett 1956, 184; Valavanis 1986, 455 n.13; Young 1984, 116 n.13 – all with 
testimonia. 
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mid-third century onwards.50 On the basis of 17 dr. per metretes we can cost the 
private contribution of Attic farmers to the staging of this festival at 5 t. 2725 dr.  
 Additionally the Athenian d"mos authorised the spending of reasonably 
significant sums of public money on this four-yearly festival (e.g. IG I3 375.3). For 
example, in 410/9 the treasurers of Athena handed over 5 t. and 1000 dr. to the 
athlothetai for the year’s celebration of the Great Panathenaia and a further 5114 dr. 
to the hieropoioi to pay for its regular sacrifice of one hundred cows (375.5-8). 
According to earlier surviving accounts (370.66-8), in 415/4 Athena’s treasurers gave 
9 t. ‘to the athlothetai for the Panathenaia’. While this sum was disbursed within days 
of the so-called Small Panathenaia, it is far from likely that it went towards covering 
the costs of this annual version of the festival.51 Firstly the absence of megala 
(‘great’) in this entry does not rule out the four-yearly Panathenaia, as this adjective 
was regularly omitted in descriptions of the large-scale versions of annual festivals 
where it would, in fact, have been entirely appropriate (e.g. IG II2 3022.3-4).52 In 
addition the athlothetai are not otherwise attested as administering any aspect of the 
annual Panathenaia until the late second century (e.g. IG II2 1036, 1060).53 Finally 
what evidence we have for the public funding of this festival renders its consumption 
of such a large sum highly unlikely. In the mid-330s the Athenians created a stronger 
fiscal base for the smaller Panathenaia by assigning to the hieropoioi responsible for 
its administration the rent from newly acquired sacred lands, which, it was 
optimistically hoped, would amount to 2 t.54 The actual rent may have only come to 
4100 dr. but it was still sufficient to cover the festival’s costliest item: the sacrificial 
cows for its procession.55 In addition the d"mos approved another 30 dr. to pay for the 
procession’s other expenses and the pannukhis or all-night celebration.56 Clearly the 
annual Panathenaia was a ‘relatively small affair’.57 As Athens in this period of 
expanding festival funding was contributing less than a talent towards this yearly 
version of the festival, its spending of over ten times this figure for the same purpose 
 
50 So described by Golden 1998, 165.  
51 Davison 1958, 31-3; Develin 1984, 133, 136-7; Kyle 1987, 38 n.31; Shear 2001, 456-8 
pace Golden 1998, 164-5; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 236; Rhodes 1981, 669-70.  
52 Develin 1984; Slater 2007, 32.  
53 Shear 2001, 462.  
54 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 81, especially fragments A.5-7 and B.1-4. This rent is more 
likely to have replaced rather than supplemented what the city had been spending on this festival 
(Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 398-403; Shear 2001, 76-83 pace Rosivach 1994, 70-2). 
55 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 81, fragment B.10-18, 23.  
56 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 81, fragment B.27-37.  
57 Tracy 2007, 57.  
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eighty years earlier is simply inconceivable. Therefore the most plausible explanation 
of these 9 t. is that they were given out to pay for the expenses that the athlothetai 
were accruing as they prepared for the Great Panathenaia of the following year. 
Boards of these magistrates appear then to have received two or possibly more 
transfers of funds from Athena’s treasurers during their four-year terms. In light of 
the two surviving figures we have for these transfers, this suggests the city most 
probably contributed between 10 and 15 t. (and possibly more) of public funds 
towards each celebration of the Great Panathenaia.58 
In view of the lacunose state of the evidence a complete breakdown of how the 
athlothetai spent this large sum is difficult to work out and is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. However, several of the more expensive items which they had to cover can 
be identified and estimated more or less reliably. For example, while Attic farmers 
provided the olive oil for the Panathenaic prizes, the athlothetai and council of five 
hundred provided the amphorae needed for its distribution (Ath. Pol. 60.1). At a 
public auction of 414, ten lots of ten second-hand Panathenaic amphorae were sold, 
fetching just over 3 obols per vessel on average (IG I3 422.41-60). As the highest 
recorded price for a finely painted pot is 3 dr. for a hydria and a ‘very good’ lekythos, 
which is a very small pot, might cost 1 obol (Aristophanes Frogs 1236), a safe 
estimate for a newly made Panathenaic amphora would be 1 dr. 3 obols.59 Thus the 
purchasing of the 2100 pots required for the games would have cost 3150 dr.60 The 
prize-list of the early fourth century details other contests whose prizes were not oil 
but cash-purses, bullion-crowns and/or cows. Thus winners and placegetters among 
tribal teams and pyrrhic choruses won cows or other banqueting supplies of a set 
amount, costing the city 1200 dr. in total (IG II2 2311.83-93).61 This list also records 
prizes of gold crowns and cash awards for winners and placegetters in the musical 
ag$nes, totaling 5200 dr. (5-22). Shear’s restoration of IG II2 2311 includes the tribal 
equestrian event of the anthippasia and contests for cyclic choruses, rhapsodes and 
boys singing to the accompaniment of a flute or playing a kithara.62 Although she 
does not estimate the prizes for these events, comparison with the list’s known prizes 
and the high prestige of the rhapsodic contest suggest that these may have cost the 
 
58 The actual amount of the third known transfer is not preserved (IG I3 378.14-15). P. Wilson 
likewise writes of the athlothetai ‘regularly’ receiving ‘sums in the region of ten talants to 
administer the festival’ (2008, 90).  
59 For the recorded prices for finely painted pots, see Pritchard 1999b, 7 with references.  
60 Pace Tiverios 2007, 16-17.  
61 Ceccarelli 2004, 94 n.9 pace Neils 1992a, 16.  
62 Shear 2003a, 103-5.  
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city up to 1 t. (e.g. Plato Ion 535e4-6). As the average of the recorded prices for a 
cow in classical Athens is 72 dr., another 1 t. 1200 dr. of public funds would have 
been required to cover the festival’s hundred-cow sacrifice.63 Finally the athlothetai 
had to pay for the preparations for, and equipment of, the festival’s pomp". For such 
expenses the city of the later fourth century gave 1 t. 4000 dr. to the epimeletai 
(‘supervisors’) in charge of the procession of the City Dionysia (Ath. Pol. 56.4; cf. 
Demosthenes 21.15). The pomp" of the Great Panathenaia was always as grand (see 
below) and involved two expenses which the supervisors of the City Dionysia never 
faced: the setting up of ikria or wooden stands for spectators in the agora and the 
making of the peplos (Ath. Pol. 60.1), which was, by all accounts, ‘an elaborate gift 
for Athena’.64 As a result, this ritual act of the Great Panathenaia may have cost the 
city in excess of 2 t.  
 In addition some of the direct costs of the festival were borne by wealthy 
citizens who volunteered or were conscripted, if necessary, to cover the training and 
equipping of its choruses and tribal teams.65 The performing of these so-called 
festival liturgies brought significant personal advantages: victory gave the khor"gos 
(‘chorus-sponsor’) and the gumnasiarkhos (‘athletic-training-sponsor’) of a torch race 
city-wide prestige, which could be cashed out as political support from the citizen 
masses (e.g. Plutarch Nikias 3.1-3).66 In addition generosity and success as a liturgist 
served as a kind of legal insurance. In court upper-class litigants invariably sought to 
build up kharis (‘a sense of gratitude’) among the jurors by cataloguing the festival 
and military liturgies which they had undertaken for the city (e.g. Lysias 3.46; 12.38; 
30.1).67 Some even admitted their main reason for performing these public services in 
the first place had been to secure leniency from any prospective jury (e.g. 18.23; 
20.31; 25.11-13).  
 It is therefore unsurprising that most of the figures we have for liturgical 
spending come from such a speech; for the speaker of Lysias 21 opened his defence 
 
63 Rosivach 1994, 95-6; Tracy 2007, 54 – both with testimonia.  
64 For these stands for spectators, Athenaios 4.167f; Pollux 7.125; Csapo 2007, 104-5; Neils 
1992a, 18-20. Postholes dating to the fifth and fourth centuries for these wooden benches have been 
excavated on both sides of the Panathenaic Way as it traverses the marketplace (Camp 1986, 45-7). 
For the testimonia for Athena’s robe, see Shear 2001, 173-86. Quotation from Shear 2001, 176.  
65 Pritchard 2004, 213, 213 n.27 with primary sources.  
66 See especially P. Wilson 2000, 109-97. For the gumnasiarkhos as the sponsor of a torch-
racing team, see, for example, Pseudo-Xenophon 1.2; Xenophon Ways and Means 4.51-2; IG II2
1250.3, 3019, 3023. 
67 Christ 2006, 171-84; Dover 1974, 176-7; Ober 1989, 231-3 – all with primary sources.  
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against a charge of financial misconduct as a magistrate by costing his own 
liturgies.68 Certainly his ‘liturgical career is unique in its intensity’: from 411/10 to 
404/3 he paid for 17 liturgies at a combined cost of nearly 10 t.69 Importantly 
however, while no other individual is known to have performed as many public 
services, the amounts that he spent on individual liturgies do not appear to have been 
out of the ordinary.70 For example, for each of the years he served as a trierarch he 
spent 5163 dr., which is very close to the average of the surviving figures for this 
military liturgy and is by no means the highest of them.71 Likewise, the 3000 dr. 
which this speaker paid for a tragic chorus, in 411/10, parallels the 5000 dr. another 
spent performing the same liturgy twice in the late 390s (Lysias 19.24, 42; 21.1). In 
view of the crises the city weathered during these years, the comparability of these 
costs – in addition to the stable liturgical spending of Lysias 21 – is quite 
remarkable.72 They bear out the ‘overriding importance’ that the Athenians placed in 
honouring their deities and suggest an underlying stability in festival-related spending 
during this tumultuous period of Athenian history.73 As they appear to be 
unexceptional, the amounts of money the speaker of Lysias 21 expended as a liturgist 
can be safely used for estimating private spending on the Great Panathenaia’s 
choruses and teams.  
 The full program of these contests for groups is securely attested for the 380s; 
for although a reasonably sized portion of the section of IG II2 2311 detailing these 
events and their prizes has not survived, enough external evidence exists for restoring 
these missing lines. In classical Athens the most popular of the tribally organised 
contests was clearly the torch race (e.g. Aiskhylos Agamemnon 312-4; Aristophanes 
Frogs 1087-98).74 By the early fourth century this event had long been part of both 
versions of the Panathenaia and the yearly festivals for Hephaistos and Prometheus 
 
68 Csapo and Slater 1994, 146-7; P. Wilson 2000, 89-93.  
69 Quotation from Csapo and Slater 1994, 146.  
70 Davies 1971, xxi-ii; P. Wilson 2000, 92; 2008, 112. 
71 Christ 2006, 146-7; Gabrielsen 1994, 124-5; Phillips 1981, 47, table 5. These figures are 
6000 dr. (Demosthenes 21.155), 5300 dr. ([Demosthenes] 50), 7 trierarchies at 5143 dr. each 
(Lysias 21.2), 4800 dr. (32.24, 27), 3 trierarchies at 2666 dr. each (Lysias 19.29, 42), and 2000 dr. 
(Demosthenes 21.80). Pace Gabrielsen 1994, 120-1 the mean of these 14 figures is 4436 dr.  
72 For example, the speaker of Lysias 21 spent 2000 dr. on a men’s chorus for the Thargelia of 
411/10 and more than 1500 dr. for a boys’ chorus at the same festival in 404/3 (1, 4). Similarly a 
pyrrhic chorus at the Great Panathenaia cost him 800 dr., in 410/9, and 700 dr. at the Small 
Panathenaia of 404/3.  
73 Quotation from P. Wilson 2000, 91; cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 177-8. 
74 Even though the lampad"phoroi (‘torch racers’) were drawn only from the upper class 
(Pritchard 2003, 299, 328).  
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(e.g. IG I3 82.31-5; II2 2311.88-9).75 The painters of the city’s pots depicted no other 
athletic event in as much detail as they did the torch race.76 As was the case with two 
other of his festival liturgies, the speaker of Lysias 21 did serve as a gumnasiarkhos 
but only for a team of torch racers which competed at another festival. Victorious 
liturgists at the four-yearly Panathenaia certainly won much greater prestige, which 
they assiduously publicised (e.g. [Andokides] 4.42; IG II2 3019, 3022), than those 
who succeeded in the same events at other religious celebrations. This means that the 
chorus- and athletic-training sponsors of Athena’s festival were probably willing to 
spend more than they would doing the same for other gods.77 As a consequence the 
1200 dr. that the speaker of Lysias 21 devoted to the torch race of the Promethia 
serves as a good minimum figure for this liturgy at the Great Panathenaia.  
 For the victorious tribe in the hamilla ne$n or ship-race the prize-list of the early 
fourth century records as prizes 300 dr. for 3 cows and another 200 dr. for a feast (IG 
II2 2311.90-2).78 These are worth five times more than the prizes for the other group 
events (84-9), which suggests that those competing in this ship-race were 
considerably more numerous than the competitors in the choral and other team 
events. This, along with the fact that naus strictly denotes a ship of war (e.g. 
Xenophon Hellenika 5.4.34-5), points to the use of triremes for this event in the 
Panathenaic games.79 If this is correct, Lysias 21 provides a minimum cost for 
readying such a crew for competition: the speaker spent 1500 dr. competing 
(hamill$menos) with a trireme at Sounion (5).80 Another well-attested event of the 
Panathenaic games of this period is the anthippasia, which saw the tribal corps of the 
city’s cavalrymen charge each other in a mock battle.81 Liturgical funding was 
probably not required for this equestrian event, since training for, and participation in, 
the anthippasia were a regular part of cavalry service (Xenophon Cavalry-
Commander 3.1, 10-14), while its victory monuments were set up by the winning 
tribe or the commander of its cavalry unit (e.g. IG II2 3130).82 
75 Davies 1967, 35-7; Kyle 1987, 190-3. For its staging at the Panathenaic games, see Kyle 
1987, 190-1; 1992, 96; Shear 2001, 335-9. We have no evidence that the torch race at the festival of 
Pan was tribally organised or liturgically funded (Parker 1996, 163-8; 2005, 477).  
76 Bentz 2007.  
77 Christ 2006, 179.  
78 Kyle 1987, 193-4; 1992, 97; Shear 2001, 339-40.  
79 Shear 2001, 340.  
80 That this ship-race took place at Sounion rules out any possible association with the Great 
Panathenaia (Kyle 1987, 194; Shear 2001, 340 n.471 pace Davies 1967, 39; P. Wilson 2000, 48).  
81 Shear 2001, 340-5; 2003a, 91 n.11; Kyle 1987, 189-90; 1992, 94. 
 82 Agora excavations, inv. nos. I 7167, I 7515. For these monuments, see Goette 2007, 120-2. 
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The purrhikh" was an event for choristers wearing a hoplite helmet and bearing 
a spear and shield, which, the Athenians believed, their city-protecting goddess had 
invented as part of the celebration of the victory over the Giants (e.g. Aiskhylos 
Eumenides 292-6).83 At the Great Panathenaia of the 380s there were separate 
contests in the pyrrhic chorus for three age-classes (IG II2 2311.84-6). Its khor"giai or 
chorus-sponsorships cost 800 dr. (Lysias 21.1). The festival probably also sported 
dithyrambic contests as was the case at its smaller celebration (Lysias 21.2; Pseudo-
Xenophon 3.4).84 Certainly there would have been enough space in the prize-list’s 
lost portion to detail prizes for this second set of choruses.85 Two age-classes rather 
than the three of the purrhikh" are more likely for this event, as separate contests for 
‘boys’ and ‘men’ are securely attested for the dithyramb at the City Dionysia and 
Thargelia (e.g. Ath. Pol. 56.3; IG II2 1138). A minimum cost for this liturgy is the 300 
dr. which the speaker of Lysias 21 spent on the same event at the Small Panathenaia 
of 409/8 (2).  
 Shear defends the common assumption that the Kleisthenic tribes each entered 
choruses in the pyrrhic contests.86 She argues for such a tribal organisation on the 
grounds that this event appears on the early-fourth-century list of prizes under the 
same heading as the euandria and the torch race (IG II2 2311.83) and the prizes for 
these last two events are described as being ‘for the winning tribe’ in lines 87 to 89.87 
For her the absence of a comparable description in the lines concerning the armed 
chorus (84-6) is due only to a lack of space on the stone. As none of the other 
testimonia for the purrhikh"’s organisation mentions tribes (Isaios 5.36; Lysias 21.2, 
4; IG II2 3025, 3026; SEG 23.103), others strongly doubt any such tribal 
arrangement.88 Paola Ceccarelli’s comments are especially damaging: ‘While it may 
be possible to find an ad hoc explanation for the failure of every one of these 
documents to mention a tribe in connection with pyrrhic competitions, the only 
comprehensive explanation is to assume that they were not organized on a tribal 
 
83 For this mythology, see Shear 2001, 38-42 with primary sources. For the event, see Kyle 
1992, 94-5; Shear 2001, 323-31; and especially Ceccarelli 2004.  
84 Davies 1967, 37; Shear 2001, 345-8; P. Wilson 2000, 40. Shear 2003b make a strong case 
that the choral victory commemorated by IG II2 3025 was not associated with the annual 
Panathenaia. 
85 Shear includes this event and the anthippasia in her restoration of IG II2 2311 (2003a, 91, 
103-5). 
86 E.g. Bentz 2007, 73; Kyle 1992, 94.  
87 Shear 2001, 322; 2003a, 90, 90 n.7.  
88 E.g. Ceccarelli 2004, 95-9; Davies 1967, 36-7; Pritchard 2005b, 151 n.47; P. Wilson 2000, 
37, 324 n.137.  
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basis.’89 The same objection can be made against the assumption that the dithyrambs 
of the Small and Great Panathenaia were also organised by tribes.90 The ancient 
testimonia do not mention tribes (Lysias 21.2; Pseudo-Xenophon 3.4).  
 We are forced then to estimate the number of required liturgies for the purrhikh"
and cyclic choruses, as we have no reason to believe that they were organised by 
tribes and otherwise lack any direct evidence for their number. Tellingly the Athenian 
people took note of how pyrrhic khor"goi performed: jurors apparently had 
significantly less kharis for a sponsor when they knew his choristers had come dead 
last (Isaios 5.36), whereas a winner could be publicly honoured and praised for 
performing his liturgy ‘well and with zeal’ (e.g. SEG 34.103.2-8). Sponsors of the 
purrhikh" also thought winning worth publicising by commissioning their own 
victory monuments (e.g. IG II2 3025, 3026; SEG 23.103).91 All of this suggests that 
victory was far from assured: individual sponsors and their pyrrhic choristers faced 
real competition when they competed in their age-class. Therefore it is likely that the 
number of choruses and hence khor"goi in a pyrrhic contest never fell below three.92 
This also seems a safe minimum for the dithyrambic event (Plutarch Moralia 842a).93 
A different type of estimate is needed for calculating private spending on the 
euandria or manliness contest (Ath. Pol. 60.3; Athenaios 565f; IG II2 2311.87). 
Although this last team event of the Great Panathenaia of the 380s was certainly 
organised by tribes and hence required ten upper-class sponsors, we do not have 
recorded figures for this festival liturgy nor, for that matter, enough evidence to 
reconstruct what this ag$n actually entailed.94 Fortunately however, a pointer to the 
relative cost of training this tribal team exists: those of its liturgists who had won 
happily publicised their victories, putting them on a par with their successes as 
gumnasiarkhoi ([Andokides] 4.42; IG II2 3022).95 This implies that the costs of these 
tribal liturgies were at least of a similar scale. Since the lowest figure we have for a 
festival liturgy is 300 dr. (Lysias 21.2) and the only one for a torch-race is 1200 dr. 
(3-4), a cautious estimate for preparing a team for the euandria might be 800 dr., 
which is also the cost of a pyrrhic chorus at the Great Panathenaia (1). On the basis of 
 
89 Ceccarelli 2004, 97.  
90 E.g. Parker 2005, 257; Shear 2003a, 91.  
91 Goette 2007, 123-5.  
92 Davies 1967, 37; P. Wilson 2000, 37.  
93 With Parker 1996, 246 n.100; 2005, 479.  
94 Crowther 1985; Kyle 1992, 95-6; Shear 2001, 331-4; P. Wilson 2000, 38.  
95 Goette 2007, 118-9.  
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the numbers and costings of liturgies we have worked out, the total of this spending 
by wealthy individuals comes to 7 t. 2000 dr.  
 
Table 1: The Cost of the Great Panathenaia 
Public Expenditure 12 t. 3000 dr.  
Market Value of the Olive Oil for the Prizes 5 t. 2725 dr.  
Festival Liturgies 7 t. 2000 dr.  
10 gumnasiarkhiai for the torch race at 1200 dr. each = 2 t.  
10 liturgies for the boat-race at 1500 dr. each = 2 t. 3000 dr.  
9 khor"giai for the pyrrhic choruses at 800 dr. each = 1 t. 1200 dr. 
6 khor"giai for the cyclic choruses at 300 dr. each = 1800 dr.  
10 liturgies for the euandria at 800 dr. each = 1 t. 2000 dr.  
TOTAL 25 T. 725 DR.  
ANNUAL COST 6 T. 1681 DR.  
Table 1 summarises my costings of the Great Panathenaia in the 380s. 
Interestingly my estimates of the global cost of this festival and the proportion of it 
which was covered by private funds are comparable to what Wilson has recently 
established for the City Dionysia: the contributions of Attic farmers and upper-class 
liturgists to Athena’s festival accounted for around half of the global cost of 25 t. 725 
dr. Thus our independent estimates of the two major festivals of classical Athens 
provide corroboration for each other. Over each four-year period combined public 
and private spending on the Great Panathenaia was, on average, 6 t. 1681 dr. per year.  
 
2. The Cost of the Full Program of State Festivals 
 
Classical Athens administered and financed many other religious celebrations: it 
regularly held contests and public sacrifices throughout the year (Isaios 9.21; 
Isokrates 7.29; Lysias 30.19-20; Thoukydides 2.38.1), apparently staging more 
festivals than any other Greek city (Pseudo-Xenophon 3.2; cf. Aristophanes Clouds 
307-10).96 The scale of this religious activity is illustrated by the so-called 
dermatikon-accounts, which record the income the city gained from the sale of the 
 
96 Ober 2008, 195-6; Pritchard 2009, 212-16. 
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hides of cows publicly sacrificed between 334/3 and 331/0.97 For each year these 
accounts run through 16 festivals and sacrifices, listing the proceeds of hide-sales 
after each celebration (IG II2 1496.68-151). Since we have reliable figures for the 
average costs of a cow and its hide (see above), these accounts also provide a solid 
platform for calculating how much Athens in the later fourth century spent on public 
sacrifices and the percentage of this figure which the City Dionysia and Great 
Panathenaia accounted for.98 Unfortunately the sale-figures for the Panathenaia, the 
annual festival of the Eleusinia and the sacrifice to Hermes Hegemonios are lost or 
incomplete.99 For the Small Panathenaia there is a contemporary inscription which (as 
we have seen) authorises the spending of 4100 dr. on its major sacrifice.100 This 
would have paid for 57 cows, while the hundred-cow sacrifice of the Great 
Panathenaia is securely attested.101 As the latter was the elaborate version of the 
festival which was celebrated every four years, these sacrifices should be averaged 
over the quadrennium to allow for comparison with the other celebrations of the 
dermatikon-accounts, which were staged annually. In the absence of evidence for the 
size of public sacrifices at Eleusis and for Hermes Hegemonios we can use for these 
two celebrations only the average size of attested public sacrifices. Table 2 details the 
results of my calculations: Athens of the 330s spent 15 t. 5902 dr. publicly sacrificing 
some 1332 cows each year, of which the sacrifices of the City Dionysia and Great 
Panathenaia represented only 8 percent.102 
97 Humphreys 2004, 85, 94; Parker 2005, 180; Rosivach 1994, 48-60.  
98 The average price of a cow-hide in classical Athens was probably 7 dr. This is the mid-
point of the range of 4 to 10 dr. Rosivach establishes (1994, 62-3) and dovetails with the 6 to 7 dr. 
which Jameson works out on the basis of classical and late-antique evidence (1988, 107-12). 
Rosivach compiles the sales-figures of these accounts for each celebration (1994, 50-3). Where 
more than one sale-figure for a festival survives my calculations employ their average.  
99 In spite of its different scale from year to year the Eleusinia was celebrated annually (Parker 
2005, 468-9). 
100 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 81, fragment B.16-17, 23-4.  
101 Shear 2001, 167-73 with testimonia. 
102 This percentage sinks lower if we factor in the 500 she-goats the city sacrificed to Artemis 
Agrotera every year (Ath. Pol. 58.1; Aristophanes Knights 659-62; Xenophon Anabasis 3.2.12) and 
the large number of cows it bought for the four-yearly festival on Delos (Ath. Pol. 54.7; IG II2
1635.35-6). Against this the sacrifice of the City Dionysia was probably larger than these accounts 
suggest, because the sale-figure of 306 dr. it records for 333/2 (IG II2 1496.111-12) is ‘surprisingly 
low’ in comparison to the 808 dr. of 334/3 and ‘those for other major festivals elsewhere on the 
calendar’ (Rosivach 1994, 52 n.109; cf. Csapo and Slater 1994, 113). 
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Table 2: Annual Figures for Public Sacrifices in the 330s 
Celebration  Skin-Sales Cows Cost  
Sacrifice to Eir"n" 794 dr.  113 1 t. 2136 dr.  
Panathenaia – 43 3096 dr.  
Great Panathenaia – 25 1800 dr.  
Eleusinia – 84 1 t. 48 dr.  
Sacrifice to D"mokratia 414 dr.  59 4248 dr.  
Epidauria 1000 dr.  143 1 t. 4296 dr.  
Theseia 1183 dr.  169 2 t. 168 dr.  
Dionysia of the Piraeus 311 dr.  44 3168 dr.  
Lenaia 106 dr.  15 1080 dr.  
Sacrifice to Agath" Tukh" 131 dr.  19 1368 dr.  
Asklepieia  284 dr.  41 2952 dr.  
City Dionysia 557 dr.  80 5760 dr.  
Olympieia  601 dr.  86 1 t. 192 dr.  
Sacrifice to Hermes Hegemonios – 84 1 t. 48 dr.  
Bendideia 457 dr.  65 4680 dr.  
Sacrifice to Zeus the Saviour 1831 dr.  262 3 t. 864 dr.  
TOTALS 1332 15 T. 5902 DR. 
The dermatikon-accounts may be a valuable indication of the extent of the city’s 
religious activities but they do not tell us what proportion of the global cost of 
festivals and public sacrifices the two major festivals accounted for. Manifestly the 
relative spending on the City Dionysia and Great Panathenaia from 430 to 350 was 
very much higher than 8 percent. Two of the public sacrifices which this inscription 
mentions may have been recent additions to the festival-program, while its first 
celebration for Dionysos, namely the Dionysia of the Piraeus, cannot be part of our 
calculations (IG II2 1496.70-3).103 This last festival – like other celebrations of the 
Rural Dionysia (e.g. IG I3 254; II2 1206) – was administered and funded primarily by 
the deme and hence was not strictly speaking a polis-level celebration.104 Importantly, 
 
103 The sacrifices for Good Fortune and Hermes Hegemonios are first attested in this 
inscription and hence may have been introduced by the expansion of the festival-program which 
Lykourgos and others supported after the mid-330s (Parker 1996, 231-2, 238 n.72; 2005, 456, 473).  
104 E.g. Csapo and Slater 1994, no. 141. Csapo 2007, 90-5; Hall 2007, 271; Pickard-
Cambridge 1988, 42-7; P. Wilson 2007 – all with ancient testimonia.  
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the standard ritual acts of an Athenian festival were of course the thusia (‘sacrifice’), 
pomp", ag$nes for choruses and tribal teams, and other competitions for 
individuals.105 Yet a god is honoured by a thusia alone in four of the inscription’s 
examples of worship, which would have been cheaper than a full-blown festival.106 
Moreover, these other ritual acts regularly cost more than the sacrifice, while the 
amounts that they consumed at the City Dionysia and Great Panathenaia were 
disproportionate to the rest of the festival program.107 
Certainly the pompai of these two festivals were the most elaborate and costly of 
the dozen or so which the city staged.108 Among their thousands of participants were 
groups representing citizens of different ages, metics and women, each of whom 
carried distinct ritual equipment, military and civilian magistrates, delegates of the 
demes and private individuals.109 In the Great Panathenaia hoplites and probably the 
entire cavalry processed as well (Thoukydides 6.56.2; Xenophon Cavalry-
Commander 3.1-2).110 During the fifth century it was only to these processions that 
Athens ordered its allies and colonists to send delegates, bearing a cow and hoplite-
panoply for Athena and phalloi for Dionysos (e.g. IG I3 14.2-8; 34.41-3; 46.15-17; 
71.55-8).111 The city spent several talents equipping and staging these ritual acts (see 
part 1 above). That they had a different order of magnitude to the other pompai is 
shown by their unique administration: the procession of the City Dionysia was 
administered by the eponymous archon and a dedicated board of supervisors (Ath. 
Pol. 56.3-4; Demosthenes 23.15) and that of the Great Panathenaia by city-based 
athlothetai (e.g. Ath. Pol. 60.1-3; IG I3 378.14-15).112 This last board of ten 
magistrates began its preparations four years in advance of the Panathenaic games 
and managed as well the contests, the making of prizes and Athena’s robe and the 
 
105 Bruit Zaidman and Schmitt Pantel 1992, 102-8; Parker 2005, 180-3; Phillips and Pritchard 
2003, xi-xii; cf. Slater 2007, 21-2.  
106 This applies to four of the five instances where the accounts record a ‘thusia’ for a deity 
(IG II2 1496.76-7, 84-5, 94-5, 106-7, 115-6, 127-8, 131-2, 140-1). The sacrifice to Zeus SOtPr is the 
exception (88-9, 118-9), as his worship included a pomp" (Parker 2005, 466-7).  
107 Boeckh 1828, volume 1, 281 (book 2 chapter 12).  
108 For the attested deme and polis processions of classical Athens, see Parker 2005, 178 n.2.  
109 For the procession of the City Dionysia, see Csapo and Slater 1994, 105-6, 113-15; 
Pickard-Cambridge 1988, 61-3. For that of the Great Panathenaia, see Parker 2005, 258-68; Shear 
2001, 120-230.  
110 Shear 2001, 128-30; Stevenson 2003, 248-51.  
111 Shear 2001, 139-43.   
112 P. Wilson 2000, 24-5.  
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awarding of winners (49.3, 60.1). No other religious celebration had its own board of 
city-based magistrates.  
 
Table 3: Festival 
Liturgies around 355 
Festival Liturgies 
City Dionysia 28 
Lenaia 7
Thargelia 10 
Hephaistia 10 
Promethia 10 
(Great) 
Panathenaia 
(40) 19 
Arrhephoria 1
Amphiareia 10  
Festivals 
outside of 
Athens 
2
TOTAL (118) 97 
At these major festivals private spending on contests for choruses and tribal 
teams was likewise hugely disproportionate. We have already discussed how the 
costs of training and equipping choruses were covered by upper-class citizens serving 
as khor"goi, while gumnasiarkhoi (‘athletic-training-sponsors’) did the same for the 
teams of torch racers. In addition wealthy individuals were responsible for a smaller 
number of other festival liturgies (e.g. Demosthenes 21.156; Lysias 21.5). In a jury-
court speech of 355/4 Demosthenes claimed that there were 60 or slightly more 
festival liturgies in any one year (20.21). Boeckh judged this claim ‘hardly credible’ 
but never investigated the actual numbers of liturgies at each festival in order to test it 
properly.113 The first to do so was John Davies forty years ago.114 Table 3 details his 
findings, which clearly vindicate Boeckh’s judgement: during the 350s festival 
liturgies added up to 97 annually, rising to 118 in the years of the Great 
 
113 Boeckh 1828, volume 2, 205 (book 3 chapter 21).  
114 Davies 1967, 33.  
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Panathenaia.115 Crucially they also suggest that the City Dionysia had 29 percent of 
these liturgies in three out of four years, while the two festivals together accounted 
for 59 percent of the total number of liturgies.116 
The four-yearly celebration of the Panathenaia also supported an enormous 
number of individual competitions. The surviving prize-list of the early fourth 
century details 27 events for such contenders (IG II2 2311).117 This festival followed 
the normal practice of running separate contests for different age-classes but the 
awarding of prizes to placegetters as well as victors set it apart from other games.118 
For individuals then the festival of the 380s had 39 contests and 81 prizes, whose 
combined monetary value was probably 7 t. 2374 dr. (see part 1 above). This program 
of individual competition was more extensive than the Olympic Games, which 
explains why this festival took up 10 days, lasting far longer than any other Athenian 
festival.119 The paucity of evidence for the three other sets of individual contests in 
the early fourth century complicates our calculation of the relative weight of 
Panathenaic spending on contests for individuals.120 What we can safely say of their 
scale, however, strongly suggests this major celebration used up the lion’s share of 
public expenditure on this class of ritual acts.  
 The games of the Eleusinia go back to the early years of the Athenian 
democracy (e.g. Pindar Isthmian 1.57; Olympian 9.99; 13.110; IG I3 988).121 Yet the 
 
115 Davies 1967, 40. Of the discrepancy between the actual number of festival liturgies and 
what this public speaker claimed Davies writes (1967, 40): ‘…one is more or less bound to 
conclude that either Demosthenes was very badly misinformed or that he was being grossly 
disingenuous. The latter is much more likely. It suited his case to minimise the extent of the 
liturgical burden, so that the continuing privileges of the ‘twenty or thirty’ ateleis, on behalf of one 
of whom (Ktesippos) he was speaking, might appear to be proportionally the less important and the 
less crippling to Athenian festival finances. The surprising and illuminating thing is that 
Demosthenes thought he could get away with it.’  
116 Davies 1967, 39-40 appears to incorporate into its tallies for the 350s the 10 liturgies of the 
Amphiareia (IG II2 417), which was celebrated at the god’s sanctuary at Oropos (Parker 2005, 457). 
Yet it is now better known that Athens lost control of this border region between 366 and the mid-
330s (Humphreys 2004, 95, 112-4; Parker 1996, 146-9). Therefore the proportion of liturgies the 
City Dionysia and Great Panathenaia accounted for, in the mid-fourth century, was probably 
slightly higher than is indicated by these percentages.  
117 My figures are based on the prize-list’s restoration by Shear (2003a, 103-5).  
118 Golden 1998, 104-112; Miller 2004, 13-14.  
119 For the Olympic program at the end of the fourth century, see Miller 2003; 2004, 113-29. 
For the duration of the Great Panathenaia, see Kyle 2007, 157-8; Shear 2001, 383-4.  
120 The staging of such contests at the Olympieia and Theseia is uncertain for this period: 
there is no evidence their programs of the Hellenistic period date back to the fourth century (Parker 
2005, 477, 483-4; Kyle 1987, 40-1, 46).  
121 Healey 1990, 1-71; Kyle 1987, 47; Parker 2005, 201-2, 468-9.  
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earliest evidence for their frequency and scope of events is the later-fourth-century 
accounts of the three supervisors of Eleusis and the treasurers of the two goddesses 
(IG II2 1672).122 After elaborating the sanctuary’s income and expenditure, they 
record the amount of wheat received as rent on its sacred lands and how it was spent 
between 332/1 and 329/8 (252-61). Seventy medimnoi of wheat were given out as 
prizes for two celebrations of a triet"ris or two-yearly version of the festival (258-9) 
and probably another 70 medimnoi for a four-yearly version (258-60; cf. 261).123 
Both versions – according to the accounts – had horse races and contests in athletics, 
music and ‘ancestral’ events (258-60). As they next mention a horse race recently 
‘added by an assembly-decree’ (261), these two- and four-yearly celebrations 
undoubtedly predate the expansion of pre-existing contests which Lykourgos and 
others championed from the mid-330s.124 By the early fourth century Athens had 
been staging for nearly a century annual ‘contests in athletics, equestrian events and 
music of every sort’ as part of its heroisation of the war dead (Plato Menexenos 249b; 
cf. Diodoros 11.33.3).125 The victors of these games took home as prizes bronze 
hydriai and lebetes (IG I3 523-5).126 Finally the four-yearly festival of Herakles at 
Marathon had athletic and musical ag$nes, whose participants competed ‘over silver 
cups’ (Pindar Olympian 9.90; cf. Nemean 9.51-3).127 
Frustratingly there is no direct evidence for the number of contests in any one of 
these festivals. Nevertheless we have two pointers to the relative size of their 
programs. Firstly the city had far less administrative capacity to plan for, and stage, 
these festivals than it did for the Great Panathenaia. The Eleusinia and Marathonian 
Herakleia were administered by the so-called annual hieropoioi, who also had 
responsibility for several other festivals and sacrifices.128 Likewise the annually-
appointed polemarch had much more to do than just organise the ag$nes for the war 
 
122 Humphreys 2004, 88. These three supervisors were elected by the Athenian d"mos 
(Rhodes 1981, 638). In addition to their sanctuary-based duties they helped the king archon run the 
processions of the Mysteries and Lenaia (Ath. Pol. 57.1; IG II2 1496.74-5; 1672, 182).  
123 Healey 1990, 18-25, 67 n.57; Simms 1975, 269-70 pace Clinton 1979, 9-12.  
124 Parker 1996, 246.  
125 Ath. Pol. 58.1; Demosthenes 60.10; Lysias 2.80; cf. Plutarch Perikles 8.6. Kyle 1987, 44-5; 
Parker 1996, 132; 2005, 469-70; Pritchett 1985, 106-12; Vanderpool 1969, 3-5. For the common 
practice of treating war dead as demigods, see Currie 2005, 89-119 with testimonia.  
126 Vanderpool 1969, 1-3.  
127 Ath. Pol. 54.7; Demosthenes 19.125; Pindar Olympian 9.84-94; Pythian 8.78-9; IG I3 3, 
1015 bis. Kyle 1987, 46-7; Parker 2005, 473; Vanderpool 1942, 335-6; Woodford 1971, 217.  
128 Ath. Pol. 54.7; IG I3 375.6-7; II2 1496.76-7, 98-9, 107-10, 134-5, 138-9; Rhodes and 
Osborne 2003, no. 81; cf. IG I3 3 for the ad hoc administration of the Herakleia of the early fifth 
century.  
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dead (Ath. Pol. 58.1-3). As a consequence the city most probably could not have 
staged sets of competitions which were more than half the scale of the Panathenaic 
games. However, a second fact points to these programs running close to or at this 
maximum of 20 contests: they were clearly extensive enough to attract foreign 
competitors. The songs of Pindar mentioning the games of Eleusis and Marathon 
celebrated the victories of non-Athenians (see above), while one of the three 
surviving prizes from the games for the war dead was found in a cemetery outside of 
Thessaloniki.129 Their prizes were of significantly less value than those of Athena’s 
festival. The prizes of wheat at the two- and four-yearly versions of the Eleusinia had 
a monetary value of 210 dr. and 420 dr. respectively.130 The silver phialai or drinking 
cups for the Herakleia would have cost no more than 4000 dr. and the bronze vessels 
of the funeral games 1000 dr.131 When these maxima and the figures for the Great 
Panathenaia are averaged out year by year, Athena’s festival takes up 19 percent of 
all contests for individuals and a staggering 83 per cent of the monetary value of their 
prizes.132 
The focusing of Demosthenes on the City Dionysia and Great Panathenaia in his 
unflattering comparison of the city’s staging of festivals and waging of war is very 
understandable (4.35-7). Considerably more time and effort went into setting up and 
staging these showcases.133 They also used up a larger amount of public and private 
money: Wilson’s costing of the City Dionysia and my own of the Great Panathenaia 
 
129 Thessaloniki Archaeological Museum, inv. no. 5243. The other two were used as funerary 
urns in Attic cemeteries (Vanderpool 1969, 1-3).   
130 The average price of a medimnos of wheat was 6 dr. (Pritchett 1956, 196-8 with primary 
sources).  
131 Silver phialai weighed between 100 and 200 dr. (D. Harris 1995, s.v. ‘phiale’; Vickers and 
Gill 1994, 40-1, 47-52). The maximum cost then is 20 cups at 200 dr. per cup. The best evidence for 
the value of the prizes of the funerary games is the 25 dr. 2 obols paid for a second-hand khalkion 
thermant"rion in the later fifth century (IG I3 421.96). This was a similar size to a leb"s and was 
probably double the value of a bronze hydria (Amyx 1958, 218). Intriguingly the individual winner 
of the torch race at the Great Panathenaia gets a hydria of unspecified material which is worth 30 dr. 
(IG II2 2311.89). So 50 dr. is a safe estimate for each of the prizes at the games for the war dead.  
132 My calculations factor in the solitary contests of 3 other festivals: the torch race on horse 
back at the Bendideia (Plato Republic 327a-8b), the footrace for youths carrying vine-branches at 
the Oskhophoria and the torch race for individuals at the festival of Pan (Herodotos 6.105). We 
have no evidence concerning their prizes. Kyle 1987, 47-8; Parker 1996, 170-5; 2005, 211-7, 463, 
477.  
133 This is borne out as well by the choruses of the City Dionysia and Thargelia: although their 
kh$regoi were appointed at the beginning of the archontic year (Ath. Pol. 56.2-3), the training of 
choruses for Dionysos went on for 7 or 8 months, whereas the dithyrambic choristers of the 
Thargelia probably only did so in the two months between the two festivals (Pritchard 2004, 214, 
221).  
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suggest around 35 t. 881 dr. per year. The study above of the standard elements of 
Athenian worship group by group now allows an estimate of the percentage of total 
expenditure which the two festivals accounted for. This was probably at least 35 
percent, which suggests the entire program of state-supervised festivals cost 100 t. 
2517 dr. This global cost of one hundred talents is an undeniably large amount of 
money. It was comparable to the running costs of the democracy itself and was most 
probably larger than the annual income of an average-sized Greek city.134 Classical 
Athens was of course the leading cultural centre of the Greek world. The disciplines 
of drama, music, oratory, literature and the visual arts were developed to a far higher 
level of quality in this city than any other, with many of the works produced there 
becoming canonical for Graeco-Roman antiquity. Ever since Johann Winckelmann – 
the eighteenth-century founder of Classical Archaeology – this cultural revolution has 
been viewed as the product of democracy.135 In particular the requirement for upper-
class poets and khor"goi to compete for the favour of lower-class spectators has been 
thought to have driven rapid innovations in comedy, tragedy and dithyramb.136 
However, this unexpectedly high estimate of spending on religious celebrations 
suggests another major reason for these innovations: the extraordinary wealth of 
 
134 Hansen costs the democracy’s honorary decrees and its payment of assembly goers, 
councillors and jurors at 92 to 112 t. per year in the 330s (1991, 98, 150, 189, 241, 254-5, 315-6). 
There had been pay for the city magistrates in the later fifth century until the oligarchic regime of 
411 stopped this practice (e.g. Ath. Pol. 29.5; Pseudo-Xenophon 1.13; Thoukydides 8.56.3, 67.3). 
Since the surviving sources from the late fifth century onwards do not mention the restoration of 
pay for magistrate, Hansen plausibly concludes that they did not receive a misthos in the 330s (e.g. 
Hansen 1991, 240-1; contra Gabrielsen 1981). A century earlier Athens may not have provided pay 
for assembly goers, which was introduced only around 400 (Loomis 1998, 20-2), but this was offset 
by the sizeable salary bill for magistrates, whose number had grown enormous to meet the 
administrative tasks of the empire. At this time there were probably 700 magistrates at home and 
the same number again working overseas (Ath. Pol. 24.3 with Hansen 1980 and Meiggs 1972, 215). 
Around 430 then the running costs of the democracy were probably not significantly lower than 
what they would be a century later (Kallet 1998, 46). At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the 
annual income of Athens was 1000 t. (see below). At this time, however, Athens enjoyed significant 
imperial income and was the centre of long-distance trade in the Aegean, while its territory and 
citizen population were around twenty times larger than an average-sized polis (Hansen 2006, 77-
84; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 70-3). Thus its annual income would have been of a different order 
of magnitude to the vast majority of Greek cities.  
135 E.g. Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998; Dawson 1995, 4-5; Pritchard 2007, 331-2. Contra 
Samons 2001.  
136 For this performance dynamic, see Pritchard 2005a, 21-2; and especially Wallace 1997. 
For the competition-driven innovations of tragedians, comedians and dithyrambic poets, see 
respectively Burian 1997, 206; Bremer 1993, 160-5; and Zimmermann 1996, 53-4.  
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Athens and its upper class and the ability of both to spare significant sums for 
festival-based ag$nes.
3. Public Expenditure on the Armed Forces during the  
Peloponnesian War 
 
The global cost of Athenian military activity cannot be reliably calculated before 
the late 430s. We may know that the siege of Samos of 441/0 to 440/39 cost the 
democracy 1276 t. (Isokrates 15.111; Nepos Timotheus 1; IG I3 363), but, before 
433/2, we otherwise lack figures for total military spending in any year or period and 
even the basic parameters of documented military ventures, which would allow us, at 
least, to build up an estimate of spending expedition-by-expedition. This lack of firm 
evidence for basic parameters scuttles the attempt of Ron Unz to calculate how much 
Athens spent on war between 478/7 and 433/2, which he estimates at 13,000 t. or 
close to an average of 300 t. per year.137 In the absence of hard information his 
calculations assume that fleets were away for the full sailing season of 8 months and 
their participants each paid only 3 obols per day.138 Neither assumption is secure.139 A 
recent study of the better-documented years of 433/2 to 426/5 suggests that there was 
no standard length of time for Athenian expeditions in the later fifth century, with 
fleets away from only a few months to many months more than the regular sailing 
season.140 The case may now be closed that the daily pay for Athenian sailors and 
hoplites was 1 dr. per day between 433/2 and 412/11 (e.g. Thoukydides 3.17.4; 6.8.1; 
6.31.3; 7.27.1-2).141 But we still do not know when hoplites began to be paid and 
when 1 dr. became the standard daily rate.142 
By contrast, the great interest which the new genre of historiography took in the 
Peloponnesian War and the larger numbers of literary and epigraphical sources 
surviving from the later fifth century mean that we have consistently detailed 
information about the expeditions of these three decades of war and reliable figures 
for state income at its outbreak. For its first phase there are also surviving inscriptions 
recording the yearly tribute which the subject cities of the empire were required to 
pay Athens and the sacred monies it borrowed to cover the war effort. While military 
 
137 Unz 1985, 24-7.  
138 Unz 1985, 25 n. 15.  
139 Samons 2000, 305-11.  
140 Rosivach 1985 (1992).  
141 Loomis 1998, 39-44, 55-6 with bibliography.  
142 Loomis 1998, 36-9; van Wees 2004, 237; 316 n.27.  
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historians have typically shied away from costing the Peloponnesian War or any 
other conflict, these figures for the democracy’s income and loans would appear to 
yield, when properly coordinated and added up, annual totals of public spending on 
military affairs from the battle of Sybota of 433/2 to within a year of the conclusion 
of the so-called Arkhidamian War in 422/1.143 
On the eve of the Peloponnesian invasion of Attike in 432/1, Perikles reassured 
the assembled Athenians that they possessed the necessary resources to win the 
impending war with Sparta and her allies (Thoukydides 2.13). As their strength lay in 
the money from their subjects, Perikles argued, they should be heartened by the 600 t. 
which they received mainly as phoros or tribute every year (2.13.3; Plutarch 
Aristeides 24.3). This imperial income also included booty, shipping tolls, the rents of 
sacred lands overseas, and the indemnities that Athens had imposed on cities whom it 
had forcefully prevented from seceding from the arkh" or empire (e.g. Thoukydides 
1.117.3; IG I3 61.39-42; 369.42).144 Because the tribute of 433/2, the closest year for 
which firm evidence exists, was 388 t. (IG I3 279), this second stream of imperial 
income probably added up to 212 t. per year at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian 
War.145 The bulk of this imperial income was managed by the Athenian hell"notamiai 
(‘treasurers of Greece’), who dispersed funds to generals on campaign and paid 
directly for other military expenses.146 Perikles carefully distinguished this 600 t. 
from ‘the other income’ (Thoukydides 2.13.3), which was raised internally from 
(among other sources) the silver mines, taxes, court-fees, the rents on sacred land, 
and the public auction of confiscated goods and properties (e.g. Aristophanes Wasps 
656-60; IG I3 421-30). Xenophon reckoned the money which Athens raised locally 
and from abroad was not less than 1000 t. in 432/1 (Anabasis 7.1.27). This internal 
income then was probably 400 t.147 Since the city would not have needed to spend 
more than a third of this last figure on the salaries of the democracy and the city-
sponsored program of festivals (see part 2 above), we can safely assume 100 t. of this 
internal income could have been directed (if necessary) to military-related 
activities.148 
143 Samons 2000, 208-9.  
144 Gabrielsen 2007, 263.  
145 Gomme 1956, volume 1, 17-19; Meritt et al. 1950, 334; Samons 2000, 200-6, 309.   
146 E.g. IG I3 375.4, 8, 9-10, 12, 16-18, 24; 464.105-6; 465.123-5, 127-8; 466.144-5. Meritt et 
al. 1950, 329-32; Samons 2000, 230.  
147 Kallet 1998, 44, 46.  
148 In the next century the spending of the city’s surplus income on campaigns was standard 
practice until the creation of the so-called festival fund by 349/8 at the latest (see part 4 below).  
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The astronomical cost of the Arkhidamian War compelled the Athenians 
relatively quickly to raise their general level of taxation (e.g. Thoukydides 2.70.2; 
3.17.3).149 In 428/7 the Athenian people imposed an eisphora or emergency tax for 
war on the property of the upper class, which raised the unprecedented sum of 200 t. 
(Thoukydides 3.19.1).150 This tax may have haunted Athenian public debate into the 
late 420s (e.g. Aristophanes Wasps 923-6), but it was probably abandoned for the 
time being when, in 425/4, the city massively increased the amount of phoros which 
their subjects were forced to pay.151 Indeed a goal of this increase may have been to 
render the taxing of the property of citizens unnecessary. From the surviving list of 
the new payments Athens demanded of individual cities the grand total of this tribute 
reassessment appears to have been slightly over 1460 t. (IG I3 71.61-181).152 Clearly 
the actual total of tribute the Athenians collected must have been lower, as some of 
the cities on this inscribed list had never been or were no longer part of the arkh",
while others were in open revolt against the imperial city. However, it was most 
probably not significantly lower; for Plutarch wrote that tribute rose to 1300 t. after 
the death of Perikles (Aristeides 24.3); Andokides said it got to 1200 t. after the Peace 
of Nikias of 422/1 (3.8-9); and Aristophanes claimed, in Wasps of 423/2, that the 
combined income of Athens was nearly 2000 t. (656-60).153 If (as seems likely) 
internally raised income and the non-tribute income of empire remained relatively 
steady during the Arkhidamian War, this figure of Aristophanes translates into a 
phoros of up to 1388 t. This literary evidence suggests 1200 t. as a safe estimate of 
tribute from 425/4 onwards.  
 As the Peloponnesian League prepared to ravage Attike Perikles also told the 
assembly there was stored on the Akropolis several thousand talents of coined silver 
and other bullion, which they could spend on defending the city as long as they paid 
back no less in due course (Thoukydides 2.13.3-6). These cash reserves apparently 
lay in the treasuries of Athena and the other gods; for, in 433/2, the Athenians 
liquidated the accumulated funds of the imperial treasury, ordering the hell"notamiai 
to transfer 3000 t. to Athena, repay all loans to the other gods and spend whatever 
 
149 Rhodes 2006, 92-3.  
150 Boeckh 1828, volume 1, 386-7 (book 2 chapter 24); Brun 1983, 22-6; Christ 2006, 161-2; 
Hornblower 1991, 403-4; Samons 2000, 205.  
151 Brun 1983, 24; Meritt et al. 1950, 345; West 1930, 238 pace Gomme 1956, volume 2, 279.  
152 Meiggs 1972, 325; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 193-4; Meritt et al. 1950, 345.
153 Sommerstein 1983, 197.  
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remained on the dockyards and city-walls (IG I3 52A).154 Incredibly a record of how 
this sacred money was dispersed survives in the form of the so-called logistai-
accounts, which ostensibly document the debts to Athena and other gods between the 
Great Panathenaia of 426/5 and its next celebration in 422/1 (IG I3 369.1-2).155 For 
these four years the logistai (‘public auditors’) detailed 808 t. of loans and the interest 
owing on each at the end of this period (2-97). As the amounts of these 20 loans and 
the years in which they were made are recorded, the total level of borrowing for each 
year can be easily calculated. In order to record presumably the monies owing as 
fully as possible, the public auditors also recorded the total amount of loans each of 
the sacred treasuries had issued between 433/2 and 427/6 and the interest which had 
accrued on these loans in the last quadrennium (98-111). Finally they spelt out the 
totals of the loans from, and the interest owing to, Athena Polias, Athena Nike and 
the other gods from 433/2 to 423/2 (112-20). The grand total of the sacred loans of 
these 11 years is 5600 t. (122-3). Although these accounts do not detail individual 
loans nor annual totals for the years from 433/2 to 427/6, the interest figures which 
they give for this period put it beyond doubt that the vast bulk of the loans of these 
seven years were issued in the first four.156 On the basis of these interest figures and 
other evidence for sacred loans (e.g. IG I3 364) the editors of the Athenian tribute-
lists also confidently estimated the totals of loans in this seven-year period.157 As 
their estimates have long been accepted, they will be integrated into my 
calculations.158 
The logistai-accounts are the key piece of evidence for estimating public 
spending on military affairs from 433/2 to 423/2. Although they never indicate the 
purpose of the sacred loans, they would appear to have been used exclusively for 
waging war.159 Firstly, putting these interest-bearing loans to a military end is 
consistent with the advice of Perikles that the people could spend their cash-reserves 
on the impending war as long as they paid back no less (Thoukydides 2.13.5-6). 
Since the Athenians clearly perceived these reserves as a real military asset and did 
act on the advice of Perikles to use this money for the Peloponnesian War, it seems 
 
154 Samons 2000, 107-63.   
155 Gomme 1956, volume 2, 432-6; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 72.  
156 Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 217; West 1930, 233-6.  
157 Meritt et al. 1950, 341-5.  
158 E.g. Jacquemin 2000, 149-50; Samons 2000, 209.  
159 As is widely assumed; see, for example, Gabrielsen 1994, 116; 2007, 265; Meiggs and 
Lewis 1969, 216; Samons 2000, 209; van Wees 2000, 107-8.  
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very likely that they also treated their disbursements as loans as he had implied.160 
Secondly, the accounts may not consistently indicate the officials who received the 
20 loans of 426/5 to 423/2, but, when they do, the recipients are either generals in the 
field or the treasurers of Greece (IG I3 369.2-3, 18, 20-1, 26-7, 56), who, as we have 
seen, had a central role in the financing of campaigns. Thirdly, the proportion of the 
yearly income which the democracy could direct to military activities was manifestly 
insufficient for covering the costs of the Arkhidamian War. For example, the two-
year siege of Potidaea from 432/1 cost the public purse 2000 t. (Isokrates 15.133; 
Thoukydides 2.70.2), while the other naval expeditions of these 2 years consumed 
around 840 t.161 As these undertakings alone cost considerably more than the 700 t. of 
annual income Athens could spend on military affairs, it obviously drew heavily on 
other funds, which, before the eisphora of 428/7, were only available in the sacred 
treasuries on the Akropolis. Finally, in the absence of a major building program 
during the Arkhidamian War, the financial demands of war are the only explanation 
we have for why the city borrowed a massive 5600 t.162 Since ‘the obvious and 
natural view of Athenian war finance’ is that the Athenians exhausted their yearly 
income before borrowing from the gods, the logistai-accounts do more than evidence 
another source of military funding.163 They also confirm Athens used up all of its 
annual income for military affairs between 433/2 and 423/2. This means public 
spending on the war-making of this period is simply the sum of the income which it 
could spend on military affairs and the attested loans.  
 
160 E.g. Andokides 3.7-9; Thoukydides 2.24.1; Xenophon Anabasis 7.1.27; Ways and Means 
5.12. Gauthier 1976, 213.  
161 For the number of ships in the expeditions of these years and their approximate number of 
days at sea, see Rosivach 1985 (1992), 45-7. At the daily rate of 1 dr. per combatant the 200-strong 
crew of a trireme cost 1 t. per month (e.g. Thoukydides 6.8.1).  
162 For public building in this period, see Boersma 1970, 82-96.  
163 For this view of Athenian war finance, see, for example, Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 216; 
Meritt et al. 1950, 329-32; Rhodes 1988, 194; Samons 2000, 23, 162. Quotation from Meiggs and 
Lewis 1969, 216.  
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Table 4 aggregates the various surviving figures for military spending over these 
11 years. The grand total for public expenditure is 16,334 t., which translates into an 
unexpectedly high average of 1485 t. per year.164 This last figure is supported by the 
reassessment decree of 425/4. Because the overriding purpose of this reassessment 
was ensuring that the city had sufficient money for the ongoing war (IG I3 71. 16-17, 
46-8), there must have been a reasonably close relationship between the new target 
for tribute and anticipated military spending. In view of the general unpredictability 
of war the latter would have been based no less on the actual military spending of the 
recent past than on apparent requirements for the short term. This suggests that the 
closeness of the 1460 t. or so for assessed tribute and my average of 1485 t. per year 
for public spending on military affairs corroborates my calculations. This public 
expenditure was supplemented by the considerable amounts of their own money 
which elite Athenians spent on trierarchies. As Athens had between 100 and 250 
 
164 Pace Kallet 1998, 46.  
 
Table 4: Public Expenditure on Military Affairs during the 
Arkhidamian War 
 
Archon 
Year 
Tribute Imperial   
Income 
Internal  
Surplus 
War  
Tax 
Loans TOTAL 
433/2 388 t. 212 t. 100 t.  – 76 t.  776 t.  
432/1 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  – 1145 t. 1845 t.  
431/0 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  –  1370 t.  2070 t.  
430/29 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  –  1300 t.  2000 t.  
429/8 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  – 600 t.  1300 t.  
428/7 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  200 t. 200 t.  1100 t.  
427/6 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  200 t. 100 t.  1000 t.  
426/5 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  200 t. 261 t.  1161 t.  
425/4 1200 t.  212 t.  100 t.  –  130 t.  1642 t.  
424/3 1200 t.  212 t.  100 t.  – 163 t.  1675 t.  
423/2 1200 t.  212 t.  100 t.  –  253 t.  1765 t.  
ANNUAL  AVERAGE 1485 T.  
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triremes at sea between 433/2 and 423/2 (Thoukydides 3.17.1-2), this private 
spending ranged between 74 t. and 185 t.165 These truly enormous costs of naval 
warfare fully explain why Perikles emphasised the centrality of money in his pre-war 
speeches and why non-elite citizens of the later fifth and fourth centuries believed the 
dunamis (‘military power’) and security of their city depended on ships, walls and 
especially money.166 
The average level of military spending varied considerably between the 
subsequent phases of the Peloponnesian War. The Peace of Nikias of 422/1 heralded 
5 years of markedly reduced military outlays, allowing Athens to build up once again 
several thousand talents of reserves (Aiskhines 2.175; Andokides 3.8-9; Thoukydides 
6.26.2).167 However, the global cost of the military activity of this phase still appears 
to have been around 30 per cent of the level of the Arkhidamian War. Between 433/2 
and 413/12, regardless of whether the city was at war, the cavalry corps, the squadron 
of guard ships and the maintenance of the fleet and other military assets most 
probably consumed around 300 t. every year (see part 4 below). Moreover, this peace 
did not check the established military hyperactivity of Athens: the city reduced Melos 
and Scione by siege, in 421/0 and 416/5 respectively (Thoukydides 5.32.1; 5.84-114; 
5.116.2-4), and campaigned about the Peloponnese in 418/17 (5.61-2, 64-75), and 
against Macedon in the following two years (5.83.4; 6.7.3). With the sailing of the 
Sicilian Expedition, in 416/5, combined military spending clearly bounced back to its 
level before the peace; for, while Sicily was not the only theatre of operations during 
the 3 years of this campaign, by the time the expedition was utterly destroyed it had 
cost in excess of 4000 t.168 
The loss of so many lives and resources in Sicily greatly distressed the 
Athenians, leaving them without enough ships in the dockyards and forcing them to 
 
165 The average cost of a trierarchy was 4436 dr. (see part 1 above). For the fleet-sizes of these 
years, see Amit 1965, 22-3; Boeckh 1828, volume 1, 354-5 (book 2, chapter 21); Rosivach 1985 
(1992), 44-51.  
166 For Perikles and financial resources, see Thoukydides 1.142.4-5; 1.143.4-5; 2.13.2-3; 
2.65.7. For this popular strategic thinking, see, for example, Andokides 3; Aristophanes Akharnians 
162-3; Birds 378-80; Frogs 365; Lysistrata 170-6, 421-3, 488, 496; Wealth 112; Demosthenes 4.40; 
8.48; 9.40, 70-2; 13.10; 22.12-17; Lysias 13.46-8; 28.15; fragment 39 Thalheim; IG II2 1604.70, 
1607b.22, 47, 62; Gabrielsen 2008; Pritchard 1998, 55; 1999a, 214-22.  
167 Samons 2000, 166-7.  
168 Samons 2000, 235. The pay for the varied crews of the 100 Athenian ships which sailed in 
416/5 would have been 3600 t. alone (Thoukydides 6.43). In addition the expedition included large 
numbers of mercenary soldiers and allies and received significant reinforcements (6.93.4; 7.20.2).  
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cut the daily pay of sailors from 1 dr. to 3 obols (Thoukydides 8.1.2; 8.45.2).169 In 
little more than a year, however, they had tapped their emergency reserve of 1000 t. 
to build and man triremes and had a force of 100 or so ships at Samos (2.24.1-2; 
8.15.1-2; 8.30.2). They had this number of ships at sea or based away from Athens 
for the rest of the so-called Ionian War, with numbers swelling to 150 ships at 
Arginousai, in 407/6, and 180 ships at Aegospotami two years later (Xenophon 
Hellenika 1.6.24-5; 2.1.20). This naval commitment – along with the terrestrial 
defence of Attike from Spartan and Theban raids (Oxyrhynchus Historian 12.4; 
Thoukydides 7.27.5) – would have kept military spending at 60 per cent or so of the 
average level it had reached between 433/2 and 423/1.170 
4. The Cost of the Armed Forces in the 370s and 360s 
 
The traditional view of Athens in the fourth century is that the population-losses 
of the Peloponnesian War and the collapse of the income-bearing empire caused a 
wholesale decline in its war-making.171 It has long been argued that the d"mos of 
postwar Athens initiated fewer wars and were reluctant to serve personally when they 
did so. As a result, mercenaries had to be employed in increasingly large numbers 
and soon formed the core of the city’s armed forces. The massive reduction in state 
income often prevented Athens from launching essential fleets and forced those of its 
generals who did get to sea to loot foreign lands or join local wars – on their own 
initiative – in order to pay for their mercenary forces. In making this interpretation 
ancient historians of the twentieth century took at face value the generalisations 
which Demosthenes made about Athenian warfare in his assembly speeches of the 
late 350s and 340s. As part of his efforts to convince the d"mos to wage war against 
Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes characterised their military behaviour as morally 
 
169 Loomis 1998, 44-5.  
170 Year-round 100 ships at 3000 dr. each per month comes to 600 t. The trierarchies required 
for these ships would have cost 74 t. The main burden of defending Attike fell to the Athenian 
cavalry (Bugh 1988, 82-5), whose regular members, after Sicily, were paid 1 dr. per day and 
hippotoxatai or mounted archers 2 dr. per day (Lysias fragment 6.75-9 Gernet and Bizos; Loomis 
1998, 45). Their total pay comes to 85 t. per year if we assume 1000 horsemen and 200 mounted 
archers (Thoukydides 2.13.8; Bugh 1988, 221). To this combined total of 759 t. per year would 
have been added the wages of the other land-based troops defending Athens and its countryside, the 
cost of shipbuilding and the costs of the warships over and above the 100 the city regularly had 
away from Athens.  
171 E.g. Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 135-8; Brun 1983, 143-4, 176-7, 183-5; Davies 1978, 
198-9; de Ste. Croix 1981, 293, 607 n.37; Ehrenberg 1951, 314-7; Mossé 1962, 315-22. For 
critiques of this decline-historiography, see Burckhardt 1995, 108-10; Harding 1988, 61; 1995, 105-
6 Millett 1993 – all with bibliography.  
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questionable and a source of shame.172 He repeatedly claimed that his contemporaries 
were falling short of the high standard of fifth-century Athenians, who had constantly 
performed acts of aret" (‘gallantry’), endured kindunoi (‘dangers’) and won many 
victories on land and at sea for the sake of just international relations (e.g. 2.24; 3.23-
6; 4.3-4; 9.36, 40; 13.21-35). They were currently ignoring the solemn duty of every 
citizen to fight for the city (e.g. 2.23-4; 3.3; 4.2-4, 52).173 By their refusal to serve 
personally they behaved as cowards, leaving mercenaries to fight their wars (e.g. 
3.35; 4.7-8, 19, 24, 42, 46; 6.36; 8.21; 9.67; 13.4-5).174 Finally, while they refused to 
pay the extraordinary tax on property for war or provide misthos for those actually in 
the field (e.g. 2.24-5; 8.21-2), they happily spent more public income on, and 
prepared more carefully for, polis-sponsored festivals than they did for any naval 
expedition (e.g. 1.19-21; 3.11-13, 19, 28, 30-2; 4.35-7). For this young and 
unestablished politician the d"mos could only restore their reputation by accepting his 
strategically questionable proposals for yet more military ventures in the north.175 
Over the last quarter of a century the close study of the actual military 
performance of fourth-century Athens has largely overturned this bleak 
interpretation.176 It has also corroborated the earlier doubts which were occasionally 
expressed about the reliability of Demosthenes as a reporter of military affairs.177 In 
particular Leonhardt Burckhardt has demonstrated exhaustively that for the Athenian 
armed forces ‘mercenaries were only an important supplement’.178 Admittedly these 
foreign troops had long served as lightly armed specialists who fought alongside the 
regular army and were increasingly employed for sieges and year-round campaigns, 
in which citizens found it difficult to participate because of their social 
responsibilities.179 Additionally the acute population losses of the later fifth century 
did make it necessary for upper-class trierarchs, despite the smaller size of fourth-
 
172 Mader 2006; Roisman 2005, 115-6.  
173 Pritchard 2007, 335; Roisman 2005, 117-8 – both with primary sources.  
174 While his audience would have interpreted the shirking of military service as cowardice 
anyway (e.g. Euripides Children of Herakles 700-1; Phoenician Women 999-1005), Demosthenes 
repeatedly says they are cowards (e.g. 3.31-2, 36; 4.42).  
175 For the lack of political success of Demosthenes before the mid-340s and the strategic 
shortcomings of his military proposals, see Badian 2000, 26-37; Cawkwell 1962a, 135-40; 1962b, 
377-8; 1963, 53; Hunt (forthcoming).  
176 Pritchard 2007, 348-9.  
177 E.g. Cawkwell 1963, 53. Burckhardt 1995, 129-33; 1996, 211-29.  
178 Burckhardt 1995; 1996, 76-153. Quotation from Burckhardt 1995, 128.  
179 E.g. Demosthenes 8.9; 23.113; [Demosthenes] 50.21-2; Isokrates 15.111-12; Xenophon 
Hellenika 4.5.11-18.  
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century fleets, to hire non-citizen rowers for their crews. But the backbone of the 
armed forces of Athens remained its citizens. Throughout the fourth century Athenian 
hoplites and horsemen regularly fought pitched battles in central Greece where their 
fighting was decisive for the outcome (e.g. Xenophon Hellenika 3.5.18-22; 4.2.16-23; 
4.3.15-20).180 Athenians also kept coming forward for naval service in reasonable 
numbers (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.29; Xenophon Hellenika 5.4.61).181 The Athenian 
d"mos, in fact, waged war more often in the fourth century than previously: they 
campaigned incessantly from 396 to 386 and then from 378 to 338 with only year-
long interruptions.182 
In this century Athens manifestly ‘still ruled the waves’: it launched the 
necessary fleets to protect its shipping-lines to the Black Sea, which were vital for its 
grain-supply (Demosthenes 18.301-2; Xenophon Hellenika 5.4.61), and was widely 
recognised as the leading sea power (e.g. Demosthenes 6.12; 8.45; Diodoros 15.78.4; 
Xenophon Hellenika 7.1.1).183 Clearly too the open debates of the democracy helped 
fourth-century Athenians to identify and effectively address their military 
shortcomings.184 Mid-century, for example, they introduced a new age-based system 
for conscripting hoplites to tackle the perceived unfairness of the old one (e.g. Lysias 
9), while in 336/5, a few years after their crushing defeat at Khaironeia, they 
extensively reformed the eph"beia or cadetship to ensure future hoplites were as fully 
trained as possible.185 The war-making of Athens did not decline then in the fourth 
century: its citizens still served as soldiers and sailors, started wars more frequently 
than ever before, undertook military reforms, and successfully kept wars away from 
their city and its countryside for most of the period.186 
Clearly an important area for military innovation was the financing of war. The 
public purse of fourth-century Athens may have been significantly reduced but 
combatants still needed to be paid properly (e.g. Aristophanes Wealth 112).  For 
naval expeditions this was a logistical necessity: as the trireme lacked the space for 
the stowing of provisions, its crew required money to purchase daily rations from 
 
180 Burckhardt 1995, 118-20; Hanson 2000, 7; Harding 1995, 11-2; Lonis 1979, 17-21.  
181 Burckhardt 1995, 120-6.  
182 Austin 1994, 528; Cawkwell 1962b, 383.  
183 Burckhardt 1995, 112; Cawkwell 1984; Harding 1988, 68-71; Heskel 1997, 137. Quotation 
from Cawkwell 1984, 342.  
184 Blanshard (forthcoming); Pritchard 2005a, 21-2; 2007, 340, 348.  
185 See Christ 2001 and Burckhardt 1996, 26-75 respectively.  
186 Harding 1995.  
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local markets or private houses (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.22, 53-5).187 There was also 
no guarantee rowers would remain at their posts if they did not receive full pay. The 
conscription of Athenians for rowing is attested once only before 350, when the 
grain-supply was seriously threatened (4-7).188 Normally individual trierarchs (as 
their forebears had done in the later fifth century) hired their hup"resia or corps of 
petty officers and their rowers directly from among those offering their services in the 
Piraeus or ports along the way (e.g. 7-8, 12-13, 18-19).189 Because volunteer rowers 
faced no effective sanction against desertion and could readily find employers 
elsewhere, they could (and sometimes did) abandon their posts if they were not 
properly provided for (e.g. 11-12, 14-16, 25, 36).190 Unsurprisingly, then, the 
Athenians, when they were carefully preparing for all-out war against Sparta in 
378/7, reformed their collection of the eisphora and, in the course of the ensuing 
hostilities, began collecting suntaxeis or contributions from the members of the so-
called Second Athenian Sea-League.191 Another significant reform in this area was 
the reorganising of the recruitment of trierarchs in 358/7.192 Additional sources of 
money for war were the surplus which the city regularly had from the internally 
raised income and the gifts of gold which it occasionally received from Persian 
satraps or the Great King.193 
In spite of these financial reforms the treasuries of fourth-century Athens quite 
often did not have the money to cover fully the pay of the expeditionary forces which 
were dispatched.194 In these circumstances Athenian generals made up the shortfall 
by drawing on the booty which they had captured (Diodoros 15.47.7; Nepos 
Timotheos 1; Xenophon Hellenika 6.2.36), plundering the countryside of the enemy 
 
187 Figueira 1998, 261-3; Gabrielsen 1994, 118-19.  
188 Cawkwell 1984, 334; Heskel 1997, 144; Roisman 2005, 125-7.  
189 Burckhardt 1995, 125; Cawkwell 1984, 338-9; Gabrielsen 1994, 105-10 pace Amit 1965, 
48-9. For the fifth-century situation, see Pritchard 2000, 112-14.  
190 Roisman 2005, 125-6.  
191 For the reform of the eisphora and its regular levying in the fourth century, see 
Demosthenes 2.24, 30; 22.44; [Demosthenes] 50.8; Isaios 6.60; Austin 1994, 546-8; Brun 1983, 28-
73; Christ 2006, 147-9, 165-6. For the suntaxeis, which were probably first paid in the late 370s, see 
Aiskhines 2.71; Demosthenes 18.234; [Demosthenes] 49.49; IG II2 43.23; Austin 1994, 552; Brun 
1983, 91-3; Gabrielsen 2007, 267-8.  
192 Gabrielsen 1994, 182-99.  
193 For the regular use of this surplus for war before the creation of the festival fund by 349/8 
at the latest, see Cawkwell 1962b; 1963, 55-6; Rhodes 1981, 513-15. 
For the gifts, see Diodoros 6.22.1; Lysias 19.24-6; Xenophon Hellenika 4.4.2; Austin 1994, 
556-7; Heskel 1997, 44, 124-5.  
194 Gabrielsen 1994, 116, 250 n.25.  
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(Isokrates 15.111-12; Polyainos 3.10.9) or forcing cities in or near the theatre of 
operations to make ‘contributions’ (Aiskhines 2.71-2; Demosthenes 8.24-6).195 
Monies so raised were judged to be public property (Demosthenes 24.11-14; Lysias 
28.6; Xenophon Hellenika 1.2.4-5).196 The d"mos authorised their collection and 
usage, either before its generals departed or while they were in the field 
(Demosthenes 8.9; 21.3; Diodoros 16.57.2-3; Lysias 28.5-6).197 Upon their return 
they submitted an inventory of what they had raised on campaign and handed over 
any surplus to the city (Demosthenes 20.17-80; Lysias 28.6). Thus these monies 
should be classified as public income.198 Finally the ultimate guarantors of the 
funding of naval operations were the city’s trierarchs; for, if public funds could not 
cover the pay of their crews, they were normally forced to do so out of their own 
pockets ([Demosthenes] 50.10; Xenophon Hellenika 6.2.14).199 
The lack of more than a few figures for the public finances of fourth-century 
Athens prevents us from using the same method for estimating military-related 
spending as we did for the Arkhidamian War. The only other available is the 
approach which we have used for working out private spending on the Great 
Panathenaia, namely the identifying of individual expenses and the estimating of each 
on the basis of surviving evidence and arguments from probability. The sum of these 
yields an estimate of the global cost of war which is the most reliable possible 
without detailed information on public finances. This tedious exercise is made easier 
if individual expenses are grouped according to the basic cost-classes of modern 
economics: capital costs, fixed operating costs, and variable operating costs.200 Into 
the first class go what the Athenians spent on the ‘capital’ of war, namely ships, war-
horses, weapons and armour. The second covers the expenses which the city and its 
trierarchs paid to keep the armed forces going regardless of whether or not they were 
formally at war. The final class includes the costs of the expeditions and campaigns 
that Athens chose to launch in any particular year. 
 From the Athenian decision of 378/7 to confront Sparta to the financial crisis of 
the later 350s enough evidence survives to derive reliable minimum totals for the first 
two of these cost-classes. The same cannot be said for variable operating costs. The 
 
195 Gabrielsen 2007, 268-71.  
196 Gabrielsen 2007, 255-6.  
197 Burckhardt 1995, 115, 130; Hamel 1998, 44-6; Millett 1993, 190; 2009, 475; Pritchett 
1971, 87-90.  
198 Pace Robbins 1918, 362-3, 378, 385.  
199 Gabrielsen 1994, 118.  
200 Brun 1983, 144-5; Robbins 1918, 361-3.  
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Hellenika of Xenophon, which is our major source for the period, ostensibly narrates 
Greek international relations from the point, in 411/10, where Thoukydides abruptly 
stops to the battle of Mantineia in 363/2. But this author, who lived away from 
Athens for most of his life, notoriously failed to cover Athenian campaigns in the 
northern Aegean, which was the major theatre of Athenian operations throughout the 
360s. For this decade and the next we must rely then on the extant speeches of 
Athenian litigants and politicians, who only mentioned those campaigns which were 
relevant to their briefs and, in so doing, normally did not canvass any of their basic 
parameters.201 The excellent work that Julia Heskel has done on the chronology of the 
360s notwithstanding, these sources do not allow us to estimate reliably the variable 
operating costs of any one archontic year.202 Fortunately Xenophon did pay close 
attention to the campaigns of the 370s, which were waged against his beloved 
Spartans. With its ‘great density of numerous and varied sources’ this decade is 
‘better known’ than the others of the fourth century and is the only one for which we 
can reliably estimate the total of variable operating costs year by year.203 
The first to cost carefully the military affairs of the 370s was Frank Egleston 
Robbins ninety years ago. His analysis of the ship- and troop-numbers of its 
expeditions remains the most thorough ever attempted and hence will be integrated 
into my calculations.204 Nonetheless his estimates of the three basic cost-classes 
incorporated the consensus-positions of late-nineteenth-century scholarship on the 
cost of a trireme, rates of pay and so forth, which have not stood the test of time. This 
necessitates the fresh estimation of the capital and invariable operating expenses of 
the 370s and the cost of each of its expeditions on the basis of current thinking.   
 As a sea power Athens could not escape the significant capital cost of 
shipbuilding. Every year its assembly decided how many kainai or new ships were 
required and its councillors forfeited their customary end-of-service honours if these 
vessels were not built (Ath. Pol. 46.1; Demosthenes 22.8-11; Xenophon Hellenika 
7.1.4). Traditionally scholars have assumed that the same number of triremes was 
commissioned year in and year out.205 Yet this assumption has limited evidentiary 
support (Diodoros 11.43.3), ignores the ships that the city regularly captured from its 
 
201 Brun 1983, 162-3; Burckhardt 1995, 124; Heskel 1997, 13-15; cf. Cawkwell 1963, 47.  
202 Heskel 1997, especially 159-81. 
203 Brun 1983, 154.  
204 Brun 1983, 154-8; Robbins 1918, 378-86; C.H. Wilson 1970, 305-8.  
205 E.g. Blackman 1969, 213-14; Boeckh 1828, volume 1, 333 (book 2 chapter 19); Robbins 
1918, 368.  
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enemies, and sits uneasily with its documented practice of intensive shipbuilding to 
meet military exigencies (e.g. Andokides 3.5; Thoukydides 8.1.3; IG I3 117; cf. 
Aristophanes Acharnians 1351-3).206 Instead Vincent Gabrielsen argues: ‘It seems 
better to believe that the number of ships to be built in a year was decided by the 
assembly with due consideration to recent losses and gains and in accordance with 
current needs and aims and the availability of resources.’207 The surviving evidence 
for ship-stocks during the 370s lends some support to this alternative view.  
 With the failure of Sparta to condemn Sphodrias for his unprovoked attack 
against the Piraeus in late 379/8, Xenophon tells us the Athenian d"mos decided that 
the King’s Peace had been broken and readied for war by putting gates on their 
harbours, aiding the Thebans and building naus (Hellenika 5.4.34-5). As part of their 
preparations they apparently also began scrutinising more thoroughly than before 
their naval capital; for although Athens of the previous century certainly had so-
called epimel"tai t$n ne$ri$n or supervisors of the dockyards (IG I3 153.18; 236.5-6), 
they apparently only began setting up annual accounts of the ships and equipment in 
the early 370s (II2 1604-32).208 The supervisors of 377/6 reported just over one-
hundred triremes in the dockyards. In their fragmentary account there are 35 ships 
which are described as palaiai (‘old’), 15 as kainai (‘new’), 3 with no description, 
and 49 for which a description has been lost or was never made in the first place 
(1604).209 If we assume that the same proportion of the last 49 ships were ‘kainai’, 
the total of ‘new’ ships then would have been 29. Admittedly the dockyard-
supervisors of later decades employed this adjective to describe not only ships which 
had been built during their terms but others which seemed as good as new. The 
account of 334/3, for example, describes ships built in 337/6 and 336/5 as ‘kainai’
and that of 326/5 a ship of 332/1 (IG II2 1623.286-9, 294-7; 1628.82-4). This usage 
makes it possible that some of the ‘new’ ships of 377/6 may have been commissioned 
as early as the late 380s. In view of Xenophon’s testimony, however, and the relative 
quietism of Athens after the King’s Peace of 387/6, it is more likely all were built in 
378/7 and 377/6.210 In the following years victories at sea swelled the size of the 
Athenian navy. At the battle of Naxos, in 376/5, Khabrias captured 49 enemy ships 
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and more than 20 others in ones or twos afterwards (Demosthenes 20.77; Diodoros 
15.34.6). The other surviving dockyard accounts of the 370s describe numerous ships 
and pieces of equipment as aikhmal$tos or won by the spear under the command of 
Khabrias, Timotheos or Iphikrates.211 Since none of these post-377/6 accounts 
describes a ship as ‘kain"’, these captures would appear to have been numerous 
enough to obviate the necessity for further shipbuilding.212 
Robbins took over Boeckh’s costing of the hull of a trireme and its equipment at 
two talents.213 This longstanding estimate is clearly much too high. A fourth-century 
trierarch had to pay 5000 dr. for a hull if he was judged responsible for the loss of his 
warship (e.g. IG II2 1628.339-68).214 Although the cost of shipbuilding would have 
fluctuated along with the market rates of raw materials, this setting of 5000 dr. as 
compensation probably implies that this was normally enough to pay for a hull.215 
From the mid fourth century the accounts of the dockyard-supervisors put the value 
of a complete set of trireme equipment at 2169 or 2299 dr.216 Together these figures 
suggest 1 t. 1234 dr. for a new trireme, which finds some corroboration in the 
assumption of Aristotle and others that such a ship could be built for one talent (e.g. 
Ath. Pol. 22.7; Plutarch Themistokles 4.2; Polyainos 1.30.6). Therefore the 29 ships 
that the city is likely to have built in 378/7 and 377/6 can be estimated at 34 t. 5786 
dr.  
 The horses of the cavalry corps were another significant capital cost. By the 
370s Athens had long helped its upper-class youths to join the corps by providing 
each recruit with a katastasis or establishment loan of up to 1200 dr. for the purchase 
of his war-horse (Eupolis fragment 293 Kassel and Austin; Lysias 16.6-7).217 Since a 
horseman paid the city back only when he retired from the corps, it is possible that he 
may have been able to offset some of this private expense by selling his war-horse. 
The most reliable evidence we have for the cost of such mounts is the lead tablets of 
the cavalry-headquarters of the later fourth and third centuries, which were 
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discovered in wells of the Kerameikos and agora.218 They record the annually 
adjusted market value of each member’s horse.219 The prices of the 19 fourth-century 
tablets which are legible range from 100 to 700 dr. and average out at 408 dr.220 A 
member of the cavalry corps also had a hippokomos or groom, who cared for his 
horse and carried his equipment and supplies in the field (Thoukydides 7.75.5; 
Xenophon Cavalry-Commander 4.4, 5.6). A safe estimate of how much a hippeus 
spent on a horse for this slave might be 100 dr., which is the lowest recorded unit 
price we have from the cavalry archive and literary sources.221 
Athenian horsemen probably retired after 10 to 15 years.222 By their early 
thirties upper-class citizens would have started political careers, picked up new social 
responsibilities as they became the heads of households, and found the physical toils 
of training and fighting as horsemen increasingly difficult (Xenophon Cavalry-
Commander 1.2, 9). In addition those whose participation in the corps depended on 
the katastasis would probably have been unable to buy a second war-horse when their 
first, after a decade or so, was no longer fit for service. Significantly the average 
depreciation of a war-horse was 100 dr. per year.223 This means a horseman could 
have used the sale of his mount to offset his establishment loan only if he retired 
within 3 or 4 years. Since it is highly unlikely that a phylarch would have let one of 
his tribal unit resign so well short of a regular term of service, horsemen ultimately 
had to pay for their mount and that of their groom out of their own pockets. 
 In any one archontic year how much was spent on this capital cost? In the 360s 
Xenophon firmly believed that the cavalry-corps had a steady membership of one 
thousand (Xenophon Cavalry-Commander 1.2, 9-10, 19; 9.3).224 With an average 
length of service of 12.5 years this translates into 800 retirements per decade. 
Therefore, 80 horsemen on average would have retired and hence repaid their 
katastaseis every year. To maintain the corps’ strength the same number had to join 
and buy horses for their hippokomoi as they did so. In light of the abovementioned 
unit-costs this points to the private spending of 6 t. 4640 dr. on horses for the cavalry 
 
218 Braun 1970, 129-32, 198-269; Kroll 1977.  
219 Kroll 1977, 97-100.  
220 Spence 1993, 274-7. The mean of the 500 or so tablets of the next century is 676 dr. Since 
the third-century cavalry was considerably smaller and more socially exclusive, its members could 
afford more expensive mounts (277-8).  
221 Aristophanes Clouds 21-3; Isaios 5.43; Lysias 7.10; Xenophon Anabasis 7.8.6.
222 Bugh 1988, 62-74, 158.  
223 Kroll 1977, 93-9.  
224 Bugh 1988, 154-6; Hansen 1991, 316.  
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per year. A dearth of evidence on basic parameters entirely rules out the estimating of 
the other capital costs: fortifications, weapons and armour.225 Therefore the sum of 
the yearly amounts which were spent on shipbuilding and horses serves as a certain 
minimum estimate for this cost-class. In 378/7 and 377/6 this was 24 t. 1533 dr. per 
year and dropped to 6 t. 4640 dr. per year between 376/5 and 370/69.  
 The cavalry also represented a significant fixed operating expense for the city. 
Xenophon confirms that the city spent ‘nearly forty talents yearly’ in order to have 
horsemen whom it could deploy immediately when a war broke out (Cavalry-
Commander 1.19). Because the katastaseis which retiring members paid back would 
have covered the loans granted to new recruits, this public money was most probably 
used for the misthos or pay which every horseman received (1.23). Forty talents 
would provide year-round pay for 1000 at the rate of 4 obols per day.226 What 
survives of Against Theozotides by Lysias corroborates this pay-rate and suggests it 
dates back to the last years of the previous century. The speech attacks this politician 
for two motions which he proposed to the Athenian assembly, probably in 403/2.227 A 
surviving fragment shows that the subject of one proposal was the misthos of the 
cavalry-corps (fragment 6.73-9 Gernet-Bizos): ‘...concerning war this Theozotides 
put forward the motion that the horsemen would receive as pay (misthophorein) 4
obols instead of 1 dr. and the mounted archers 8 obols instead of 2 dr.’228 Lysias tell 
us this proposal was carried (79-81). On the basis of this fragment the fixed operating 
cost of the cavalry, before 403/2, appears to have been more than one half higher than 
in Xenophon’s day and, if pay for the cavalry was halved as it was for the other 
wings of the armed forces in 412, it would have been more than three times higher 
during the first three phases of the Peloponnesian War.229 Critically gross pay of 4 
obols would normally not have been sufficient to cover a corps-member’s day-to-day 
expenses.230 For example, Iain Spence very carefully calculates how a fourth-century 
horseman had to spend between 3 and 6 obols per day (and considerably more during 
 
225 Brun 1983, 147-8; Gabrielsen 2007, 258; 2008.  
226 Loomis 1998, 51; Kroll 1977, 97-8 n.36.  
227 Stroud 1971, 297-301.  
228 With Loomis 1995.  
229 Loomis 1998, 45-6.  
230 For most of the classical period Athenian authors employed misthos to describe the sum of 
military pay and any other monies handed out for maintenance in the field (Loomis 1998, 33-6, 49). 
This changes only in the late 350s when a distinction emerges between the sit"resion or 
maintenance money which generals handed out and misthos which was over and above this (e.g. 
[Demosthenes] 50.10).  
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times of shortage) on the feed for his war-horse and that of his groom.231 As a 
consequence, his misthos never fully defrayed the cost of his mount. Corps-members, 
finally, did not receive any extra pay when on campaign; there is simply no 
evidentiary support for the older view that horsemen received 1 dr. per day in the 
field.232 In his First Philippic of 352/1 Demosthenes suggests that the horsemen of his 
year-round amphibious force should receive a sit"resion of 1 dr. per day (4.28-9). But 
his whole proposal was rejected by the d"mos, and Xenophon, writing around the 
same time, implies that the daily pay for horsemen had long remained unchanged 
(Ways and Means 6.1).233 
Athens in the 370s also kept at sea or had ready for deployment a fixed number 
of triremes. The Paralos and Salaminia were employed for the urgent conveying of 
messages and generals and could (if required) play leading parts in naval battles.234 
For each of these so-called sacred ships the people elected annually a tamias or 
treasurer, who was given 12 t. of public funds (Ath. Pol. 46.7; Demosthenes 21.171, 
174). Since the misthos for sailors was probably restored to its pre-412 level at the 
beginning of the fourth century, this amount would have covered exactly the pay of a 
trireme-crew for an entire Attic year.235 That it was so used seems very likely: these 
ships could only have been deployed in the ways they were if a full complement of 
highly trained sailors was always at hand. These treasurers apparently also doubled 
up as the trierarchs and hence also bore the regular out-of-pocket expenses of this 
liturgy (Demosthenes 21.171, 174; Isaios 5.6; Plutarch Themistokles 7.5). With the 
inclusion of these two trierarchies the total of this fixed operating cost would have 
been 25 t. 2872 dr.   
 Athens in the fifth century regularly had twenty guard ships at sea (Ath. Pol. 
24.3; cf. Thoukydides 8.74.2-3). Direct evidence may be lacking for the city 
deploying a similar force in the next century but this, too, seems likely.236 Guard 
ships were manifestly required: in the years before the King’s Peace, and again in the 
370s, private raiders and Spartan ships sailed out from Aegina to attack Attike and its 
coastal shipping (Xenophon Hellenika 5.1.1-25; 6.2.1). That Athens took action 
 
231 Spence 1993, 280-5.  
232 E.g. Robbins 1918, 378.  
233 Hansen 1991, 316.  
234 E.g. Demosthenes 4.34; 8.29; Thoukydides 3.33.1, 77.3; 6.53.1, 61.4; 8.74.1; Xenophon 
Hellenika 2.1.3; 6.2.14. Brun 1983, 149-50; Gabrielsen 1994, 73, 243 n.12.  
235 It was most probably restored to 1 dr. per sailor per day or 1 t. per trireme crew per month 
(Loomis 1998, 57-8).  
236 Brun 1983, 150-1; Robbins 1918, 373-6; C.H. Wilson 1970, 313-4.  
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against these threats is clearly implied by what Xenophon writes of the herculean 
efforts of Iphikrates to man a large fleet in 373/2 (Hellenika 6.2.14): ‘He also 
obtained from the Athenians whatever war-ships were cruising here or there in the 
neighbourhood of Attica, as well as the Paralus and the Salaminia, saying if matters 
in Corcyra turned out successfully, he would send them back many ships.’237 In light 
of the post-imperial city’s reduced circumstances scholars normally assume it had 
around half the number of guard ships it did in the previous century (cf. 2.2.20). 
Because the coasts of Attike could have been easily attacked any time during the 
sailing season of eight months, the average length of service of these ships may well 
have been 6 months.238 The combined salary and trierarchic expenses of such a force 
is 67 t. 2360 dr. Smaller fixed operating costs were the pay for the hoplites which the 
Athenians stationed in the forts of Attike, their garrisons abroad, and the corps of 
eph"boi or eighteen- and nineteen-year-old cadets, which possibly dates back to the 
370s (Aiskhines 1.49; 2.167). Due to the paucity of our evidence, once again, we 
cannot determine the basic parameters of these military activities and hence their cost 
to the public purse.239 What we can conclude, however, is that the Athenians of the 
370s, before they even dispatched a naval expedition or land army, spent no less than 
132 t. 5236 dr. per year on the fixed operating costs of their armed forces. 
 For this decade Robbins identified eleven distinct campaigns and determined 
their chronologies on the basis of the modern calendar year.240 In estimating the 
variable operating costs of the Athenian armed forces I employ the troop- and ship-
numbers which he worked out for these campaigns and assign each to archontic 
years.241 I split trierarchic costs equally between archontic years when a naval venture 
 
237 Translated by Brownson.  
238 Brun 1983, 151.  
239 The number of ephebes and the amount of public funds spent on their upkeep are well 
attested for the period after the major reform of this corps around 336/5 (Ath. Pol. 42; Hansen 1985, 
12, 47-50), which allows Hansen to cost it at ‘some 25 talents’ (1991, 316). Although there is no 
strong evidence for the number of ephebes before this reform, they did not receive state-support and 
hence would have been considerably less numerous (Burckhardt 1995, 131; Humphreys 2004, 88-9; 
Pritchard 2003, 328-30 pace Brun 1983, 152-3).  
240 Robbins 1918, 378-86.  
241 I assign the campaigns which Robbins numbered to archontic years as follows: campaign 2 
and the first 2 months of campaign 3 to 378/7; the remaining 4 months of campaign 3 and campaign 
4 to 377/6; campaign 5, the first 4 months of campaign 6, and the first 4 months of campaign 7 to 
376/5; the remaining 4 months of campaign 6, and the remaining 11 months of campaign 7 to 
375/4; the first 9 months of campaign 8 and the first 3 months of campaign 9 to 374/3; the next 12 
months of campaign 8, the remaining 4 months of campaign 9, and the first 3 months of campaign 
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straddles the two. Since upper-class citizens were obliged to bear these only for 
twelve months in any one trierarchy and could claim a two-year exemption from all 
liturgies after the undertaking of this public service (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.39; Isaios 
7.38), my calculations include a second set of trierarchs if an expedition went for 
more than a year.242 Finally I assume that the cost of a trierarchy was 4436 dr., the 
gross pay of a soldier or sailor 1 dr. per day, and the total pay of a trireme-crew 1 t. 
per month.243 Table 5 summarizes the results of my calculations and aggregates the 
figures of the three cost-classes. The annual high of nearly one thousand and the low 
of only one hundred and forty talents once again bear out the great variability in 
military spending from year to year. The annual mean of the global cost of military 
affairs from 378/7 to 370/69 is 522 t.  
 
Table 5: Public and Private Expenditure on 
Military Affairs in the 370s 
Archon 
Year 
Capital
Costs 
Fixed 
Operating
Costs 
Variable 
Operating
Costs 
TOTAL 
378/7 24 t. 133 t. 72 t. 229 t.  
377/6 24 t.  133 t.  112 t.  269 t.  
376/5 7 t. 133 t.  787 t.  927 t.  
375/4 7 t.  133 t.  858 t.  998 t.  
374/3 7 t. 133 t.  229 t.  369 t.  
373/2  7 t.  133 t.  500 t.  640 t.  
372/1 7 t.  133 t.  787 t.  927 t.  
371/0 7 t.  133 t.  – 140 t.  
370/69 7 t.  133 t.  60 t.  200 t.  
ANNUAL AVERAGE 522 T.  
10 to 373/2; the remaining 12 months of campaign 8, and the remaining 12 months of campaign 10 
to 372/1; and campaign 11 to 370/69.  
242 Christ 2006, 152.  
243 Loomis 1998, 57-8.  
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Admittedly the absence of consistently detailed evidence for the campaigns of 
the 360s reduces the reliability and granularity of any estimate of military spending in 
the decade. However, what can be established with some confidence about this 
decade’s scale of military activity suggests that the overall level of military-related 
spending was no less than in the 370s. The battle of Leuktra of 371/0 completely 
destroyed Sparta as a regional power and gave the Athenians their long-desired 
opportunity to restore the control of the Khalkidike and the Khersonese that they had 
lost at the end of the Peloponnesian War.244 For the subsequent campaigns George 
Cawkwell consolidated the evidence for ship numbers a quarter of a century ago (e.g. 
Diodoros 15.71.3-4).245 His conclusion has been widely accepted: ‘All in all, it would 
not be surprising if the Athenians had 40 or 50 ships a year out on active service in 
the 360s.’246 The generally smaller naval expeditions of the early to mid fourth 
century lasted longer on average than those of the Arkhidamian War: in the 360s 
alone two went for more than 6 months and another three for a year or more.247 In this 
context a safe assumption for the average length of service for the city’s warships 
(including the guard ships) would be 6 months.248 To keep at sea for this time the 45 
ships Cawkwell proposes would have cost the public purse and upper-class trierarchs 
333 t. 1620 dr.249 
Although there is no reason to believe fixed operating costs increased in the 
360s, capital costs were probably several times higher. At the close of the previous 
decade the city’s dockyards would have had no more than 165 warships.250 By 357/6, 
the next archontic year for which a naval inventory survives, the total had risen to 
283 (IG II2 1611.5-9). As the intervening period saw ‘no great captures’, Athens of 
 
244 Heskel 1997, 15-17.  
245 Cawkwell 1984, 334-5 with primary sources.  
246 Cawkwell 1984, 334. E.g. Burckhardt 1995, 122.  
247 Pace Demosthenes 9.50-1. Iphikrates and his forces were at Amphipolis from September 
369 to May 365 (Heskel 1997, 22-6, 40-6). Timotheos left Athens with 30 ships in July 366, took 
Samos in May 365, and then moved north for 2 years of campaigning in the Khalkidike (26-37, 43-
52, 134-53). Ergophilos spent 6 months defending Sestos in 363/2 (Demosthenes 2.104; Heskel 
1997, 85-8, 141-2). Timomakhos campaigned in the region for the full term of his generalship in 
362/1 ([Demosthenes] 50), while Kephisodotos commanded a small fleet in the Hellespont for 7 
months in 360/59 (Demosthenes 23.165; Heskel 1997, 54-60).  
248 The exceptions were the Paralos and Salaminia whose crews were paid year round (see 
above).  
249 The cost of the two messenger ships alone was 25 t. 1620 dr.  
250 This is simply the sum of the 102 ships of 377/6 and the documented net gains from the 
subsequent sea battles of the 370s (see above).  
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the 360s must have built very many more ships than in the previous decade.251 
Simply to keep ship-numbers steady would have required the boul" to commission 8 
ships per year on average.252 In the 13 years from 370/69 another 9 new ships per 
year would have been needed on average in order to get ship numbers to where they 
were in 357/6. At a construction cost of 1 t. 1234 dr. per trireme then the average 
amount Athens of the 360s spent on shipbuilding per year would have been 20 t. 
2978 dr. As the total cost of the cavalry’s horses probably did not change, this 
sustained shipbuilding would have lifted minimum capital costs to no less than 27 t. 
1618 dr. per annum. For the 360s the public and private spending on military 
activities which is estimable adds up to some 401 t. But this does not include the 
misthos of the mercenary and citizen soldiers whom the Athenians of this decade 
regularly deployed to bolster the trireme crews of their expeditions. The one 
surviving set of basic parameters there is for such deployments suggests that they 
would have been a very significant variable operating cost: Isokrates tells us 
Timotheos employed 8000 peltasts during his 10-month siege of Samos in 366/5 
(15.111-12). Their pay alone would have been 406 t. It seems highly likely then that 
the global cost of the Athenian armed forces would have continued at the average 
level of five hundred talents per year throughout the 360s. 
 
5. Conclusion: Athenian Spending Priorities 
 
This chapter disproves categorically Boeckh’s judgement that classical 
Athenians spent more on the religious celebrations of the city than its armed forces 
and that the two passages which he cited in its defence manifestly unreliable. 
Admittedly my estimates do confirm that the global cost of state-sponsored festivals 
from 430 to 350 was significant: at some 100 t. per year this was comparable to the 
operating costs of the democracy and fully justified Aristophanes’ association of 
wealth with the ‘holding of musical and athletic contests’ (Wealth 1161-3). Since the 
City Dionysia and Great Panathenaia accounted for at least 35 percent of this total, 
the focusing of Demosthenes on these two showcases in his unflattering comparison 
of the city’s staging of festivals and its war-making also seems to have been justified 
(4.35-7). In the times of war, however, this chapter demonstrates that military-related 
expenditure dwarfed what was spent on all other public activities combined. During 
 
251 Quotation from Robbins 1918, 371.  
252 Since the average lifespan of a trireme was probably 20 years (Blackman 1969, 214-6), 
half of the original 165 ships would have retired in the course of the 360s.  
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the 370s and 360s the average annual total of public and private spending on the 
armed forces was not less than 500 t. This is five time as much as what Athens and its 
private citizens spent on state-supervised festivals and sacrifices each year. With the 
imperial revenues and the accumulated reserves of the previous century public 
expenditure alone on military affairs from 433 to 423 was 1500 t. on average per 
year. In the course of the Peloponnesian War it ranged between five and fifteen times 
more than what was spent, in total, on state-sponsored festivals and sacrifices.  
 Even in times of peace the Athenian army and navy used up more public and 
private money than either the democracy or its program of religious celebrations. In 
the 370s and 360s the total of capital and fixed operating costs of the armed forces 
was more or less 150 t. per year. This annual recurring expenditure was almost 
double before 412, when Athens had twice the number of guard ships and the daily 
pay of its larger cavalry corps was three times higher. Classical Athenians, however, 
bore the burdens of war more frequently than they reaped the benefits of peace. They 
waged war from 396 to 386 and then from 378 to 338 with only brief periods of 
respite. In the previous century they fought on multiple fronts from 431 to 404 and 
were at war on average for two out of three years, never enjoying more than a decade 
of peace.253 In addition classical Athenians accepted very high numbers of battlefield 
deaths and constantly glorified and legitimised their military victories and power in 
the city’s public art and architecture, public discourse and civic ceremony.254 In 
addition war and foreign policy were the main topics of political debate, with war and 
peace being compulsory items on the agenda of the ekkl"sia kuria or main assembly-
meeting of each month (e.g. Aristophanes Akharnians 19-27; Ath. Pol. 43.4). The 
clear differential between festival- and military-related spending, the almost constant 
campaigning of the Athenian democracy and its general culture of militarism put it 
beyond doubt that it was not drama or religion but polemos which was the overriding 
priority of the Athenian people. 
The two passages which Boeckh cited in defence of his negative view of 
Athenian funding priorities are manifestly unreliable.255 The comparison which 
Demosthenes drew between the disorganised war-making of his contemporaries and 
their staging of festivals was part of his early rhetorical strategy to shame the d"mos 
into taking up arms against Philip of Macedon (4.35-7). For classical Athenians 
 
253 Garlan 1975, 15.  
254 Garlan 1995, 53-4; Pritchard 2007, 335-6; Raaflaub 2001, 323-8.  
255 Pace P. Wilson 2008, 119.  
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orderliness, which was denoted by eutaxia, eukosmia and similar terms, encouraged 
citizens to be s$phrones (‘moderate’), law-abiding and respectful of elders and 
underwrote the victory and praiseworthy performance of soldiers and sailors alike 
(e.g. Aiskhines 1.22-7, 33-4; Demosthenes 18.216; Xenophon Memorabilia 
3.1.17).256 In describing their military activity as ‘disordered (atakta), uncorrected 
and indeterminate’ Demosthenes was clearly accusing his fellow citizens of not 
meeting this civic virtue (Demosthenes 4.36). But his comparison did more than 
simply bear out this lack. The staging of festivals was essentially commendable: they 
delighted their objects of worship and gave mortals respite from (among other things) 
the ponoi (‘toils’) of war (e.g. Homeric Hymn to Apollo 146-50; Thoukydides 
2.38.1).257 Demosthenes, however, criticised the Athenian people for preparing for 
the City Dionysia and Great Panathenaia more carefully than for war and for 
spending more on these festivals than they did on ‘one of their naval expeditions’ 
(4.35-7). This preference for the terpsis or delight of festivals implies that 
contemporary Athenians are no longer willing to endure the kindunoi and ponoi of 
hegemony (as their ancestors had done) and aligns them to the feast-loving 
Phaiakians of Homer or, worse still, the historical Ionians, whose soft living and 
general unmanliness were thought by classical Athenians to have made them 
unwilling to bear the burdens of war in defence even of their own freedom (e.g. 
Herodotos 1.143; 5.68; 6.11-14; Thoukydides 1.99).258 
These and other aspersions of Demosthenes about Athenian war-making are 
demonstrably false. In particular the citizens of fourth-century Athens usually spent 
many times more on a single naval expedition than they did on the City Dionysia and 
Great Panathenaia. By the time of his assembly speech an Athenian fleet normally 
numbered 30 ships and was probably away on average for 6 months.259 The 36 t. per 
annum which the Athenians spent on these two festivals would have kept such a force 
at sea for little more than a month. Indeed Demosthenes even undercut his own claim 
about Athenian funding priorities in the course of this speech, when he costed the 
small amphibious force that he was proposing at more than 90 t. (4.28). Therefore his 
so-called First Philippic bears witness to the unexpected licence which the Athenian 
 
256 Roisman 2005, 192-5.  
257 For the enjoyment of festivals by deities, heroes and heroines, see Scanlon 2002, 26-9.  
258 On the ‘delight’ of mortals at festivals, see Scanlon 1983, 157-8; 1988, 240, 242. For the 
Phaiakians and their ancient reception-history, see especially Dickie 1984. 
259 For the return of fleets to this scale by 353/2, see Burckhardt 1995, 114; Cawkwell 1962a, 
130, 139; 1984, 334-5. For 6 months as an average length of service in the 360s, see part 4 above. 
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d"mos gave their public speakers, their tolerance of unwarranted criticism, and the 
attraction of foreign policy for young and ambitious politicians as a topic of debate 
where they could more easily distinguish themselves.260 Less unexpected is the claim 
of Plutarch that Athens spent more on tragic productions than they did on maintaining 
their fifth-century empire or fighting the Persian Wars (Moralia 349a). This was 
made in an epideictic oration of the late first century of our era which Plutarch 
probably delivered at Athens (345f).261 Its unusual argument is that the generals and 
military victories of classical Athens are more deserving of praise than its historians, 
orators, poets and visual artists (e.g. 345c, 346f, 347c). This may have belittled 
Plutarch’s métier as a writer but gave him ample opportunities to display his rich 
knowledge of Athenian history, literature and public art. Since On the Glory of 
Athens is clearly no serious analysis of classical Athens, its demonstrably wild 
exaggerations about Athenian funding priorities cannot be taken at face value.262 
29 July 2009 
260 Raaflaub explains (2001, 319-20): ‘Foreign policy and wars provided the bulk of the 
assembly’s agenda and most of the contentious issues. This was the sphere in which politicians 
could distinguish themselves and here they fought their rhetorical battles. In such an atmosphere 
proposals for activist and aggressive policies a priori had a better chance: glory and a great 
reputation for leadership depended on success in action and victory, not on caution, quietism, and 
peace.’  
261 Russell 1973, 31-4.  
262 Parts of this chapter were delivered, in 2008, at the twenty-ninth conference of the 
Australasian Society for Classical Studies, convened by the University of Canterbury, and to 
seminars at the University of Sydney and Macquarie University; and, in 2009, to a seminar at the 
University of Copenhagen and at the combined annual meeting of the Classical Association and the 
Classical Association of Scotland, which was convened by the University of Glasgow. I am grateful 
for the thoughtful comments of those who heard these papers. Sincere thanks also go to those who 
commented on earlier drafts of this chapter or helped me work through the challenges of 
econometric analysis. They include Jumana Bayeh, Alastair Blanshard, Eric Csapo, Peter Fawcett, 
Kristy Fisher, Mark Golden, Mogens Hansen, Julia Kindt, Donald Kyle, Margaret Miller, Paul 
Millett, Robin Osborne, David Phillips, Kurt A. Raaflaub, P.J. Rhodes, Iain Spence, Allan Stam, 
Panos Valavanis, John Whitehorne, Peter Wilson and my co-authors in this volume. I am 
responsible for any remaining errors and have translated the passages of Greek unless otherwise 
indicated.  
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